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ABSTRACT 
COMPARATIVE MEMORIES: WAR, DEFEAT, AND HISTORICAL MEMORY 
FORMATION IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICAN SOUTH AND POST-WORLD 
WAR II GERMANY 
Taulby H. Edmondson, B.A., Emory & Henry College 
M.A., Appalachian State University 
Chairperson: Judkin J. Browning 
 Despite the vast research that already exists on historical memory of war in the 
American South and Germany, less is known about the inherent role that social, cultural, and 
political circumstances play in the creation of memory. Thus, both societies will be compared 
and contrasted throughout this thesis in order to flesh out those circumstances and reframe 
memory as a human process that can exceed national boundaries and conditioning. 
Obviously, this is not a perfect comparison as both societies have dynamic histories, cultures, 
and societal values that differ in both time and space. But when one considers some of the 
smaller likenesses between the defeated sides of the American Civil War and World War II 
(e.g. both committed acts prior to the war that modern society has deemed the pinnacles of 
oppression and injustice; both engaged in war to further the ideals behind such acts; and both 
were ultimately defeated, humiliated, and occupied by outside forces that sought to guide 
their progression into the future), larger generalizations can be made. By analyzing this 
comparison through various forms of literature (both academic and popular), political 
motivations, cinema, memorialization, and the suppression of countermemories throughout 
the end of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this thesis determines that the American 
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South and Germany both tried to remember as much as they forgot about wars and societies 
that took place in their pasts. At first, this conclusion seems to counter the ideas of German 
forgetfulness and insistent Southern remembrance via the Lost Cause that have been 
established in a litany of prior scholarship. However, while this thesis maintains those tenets, 
it establishes that humiliation and the ability of the occupier (in this case the American Union 
and the Allies) to maintain control over memory formation brought about two specific types 
of myth making from the defeated side. In the South, where Southerners were able to 
overthrow the North both ideologically and politically, this took the form of over-
romanticization of the Confederacy under the Lost Cause. In Germany, however, where the 
Allies controlled ideology and politics absolutely, those directly associated with the Nazis 
became regarded as the identifiable wrongdoers and the rest of German society romanticized, 
through omission in war-related memorials and cinema specifically, their own actions during 
the Holocaust and World War II. Thus, this work increases understanding about the role that 
defeat in war plays in the continued formation of historical memory.      
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1814, romantic poet William Wordsworth published The Excursion: Being a 
portion of The Recluse, a poem, and in six lines captured memory as it is commonly thought:  
…And, when the steam 
Which overflowed the soul had passed away,  
A consciousness remained that it had left,  
Deposited upon the silent shore  
Of memory, images and precious thoughts;  
That shall not die, and cannot be destroyed.
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Today though, historians, philosophers, and thinkers from every field of the humanities have 
questioned the assumption that memories are artifacts that cannot be destroyed to redefine 
the thinking of memory and how it is studied. Now it appears “that remembering is primarily 
an activity of the present.”
2
 It is an activity that is triggered consciously, but molded and 
driven by the subconscious to meet the needs of the surrounding social, political, and 
physical environment. On one hand Wordsworth is correct: memory remains after the 
                                                          
1. “Book VII,” lines 25-30, in William Wordsworth, The Excursion: Being a portion of The Recluse, a poem 
(London: T. Darison, Lombard-Street, Whitefriars, 1814), 310. The excerpt is also found in John B. Bowles, 
ed., introduction to Shapers of Southern History (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2004), vii. 
 
2. Quote from Bowles, Shapers of Southern History, vii. In the introduction of Shapers of Southern History, 
editor John B. Bowles makes the same argument about Wordsworth’s connotation of memory vís a vís the 
autobiographical histories recalled by the subjects of his book (influential Southern historians of the twentieth 
and twenty first centuries). For the purposes of this writing, Bowles’ anthology is of little relevance.  However, 
his use of Wordsworth’s poetic excerpt and subsequent argument about memory being an “activity of the 
present” are duplicated here as his ideas surrounding the nature of memory are invaluable to understanding 
collective memory in this thesis.    
2 
 
passing of generations. However, the act of remembering needs to be thought of as a 
historical process that, when left behind, is further molded, and built upon, as new facts come 
to light and others are omitted. Memories delve into the souls of society; they are part of a 
fluid process, but they are also solid representations of dominant societal values, motivations, 
and actions that form human identities. On a collective level, memory of a particular event or 
time period becomes part of a zeitgeist, or, as French social theorist Michel Foucault would 
argue, a strong societal discourse.   
According to Foucault, discourse is a social structure comprised of systems of 
thought—ideas, beliefs, attitudes, rituals, and courses of action—that systematically 
construct the experiences, subjects, and society that a person experiences. The role of 
discourse in wider social processes is to construct current information that legitimates and 
maintains power through the subjects that speak on its behalf. More specifically, it produces, 
represents, and constrains truth through use of objects (what can be spoken of), ritual (where 
and how one may speak), and privilege (who may speak).
3
 Interpretations of past events and 
time periods—whether analyzed critically or casually recollected—then too are indicative of 
the “truths” that discourse creates. On a collective level, they represent and subsequently 
further the norms and values of a society as an object of discourse. Historical interpretations 
are nothing more than “nodes within a network,” Foucault would argue. Much like a book is 
not made up of individual words on a page, but rather “is caught up in a system of references 
to other books, other texts, other sentences,” historical memory is connected to a larger, 
overarching web of knowledge and the ideas to which it relates.
4
 
                                                          
3. Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse of Language, trans. A. M. Sheridan 
Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1971), 21-29. 
 
4. Ibid., 26. 
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A problem with collective memory then becomes apparent: since memories create, 
destroy, and embed themselves within the values, norms, and governing structures of a 
society and culture, their recollection and resulting hypocrisies are hidden by their casual 
acceptance as truths. For the individuals participating most closely within those structures, 
specifically those with power, this is especially true as they are not only representing the 
“truth,” but driving its creation and dispersing it to those below them on the power hierarchy. 
Romanticization, myth making, and outright forgetfulness are common results that too often 
go unconsidered and work in contrast to reality. But even though what is remembered is 
often quite different from what actually happened, what is remembered is important in and of 
itself as it is an insight into the common sentiments of a given society. Thus, students and 
teachers of history must not only think critically about where and when people have used 
history to create negative societal constructs, but must also force themselves to understand 
why those memories were used and what purpose they served—no matter how ahistorical or 
hypocritical they may be.  
Recollection of the Nazis and World War II in Germany and the Confederacy and the 
Civil War in the American South are pertinent examples of popular memory embedded 
within societal discourse. And, due to some deep similarities, the two seemingly unrelated 
memories illuminate the construction, and possible pitfalls of, romantic memory as a part of 
national identity. This is due to the fact that both societies, in their antebellum forms, held 
sets of values and beliefs that were immediately challenged in the post-war years as injustices 
and oppression. For the American South, which previously had no concern with 
memorialization and Southern tradition due to a lack of homogenized ideology before the 
war, this meant that Southerners would have to confront the humiliation, damaged self-
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image, and loss of honor that they suffered at the hands of the North.
5
 Anguish coupled with 
a devastated economy to create the anti-North attitude and the Lost Cause myth prevalent 
among Virginia’s elite in the years immediately following the war.
6
 Reconciliation with the 
North was immediately rendered virtually impossible as elitist sentiments changed the 
opinions of even Southern whites pushed to poverty by the destruction of the war who would 
have benefitted from national unity and government intervention. However, those who were 
able to maintain ideological power forced their Lost Cause ideology down the power 
hierarchy in such a way that it assuaged the psychological burden of the South’s damaged 
masculinity.
7
 In other words, it appealed to a society that was already “defensive about [its] 
public image and more than a little anxious for reassurance” and subsequently ushered in the 
most notable era in American history for erecting monuments in honor of “heroic soldiers, 
martyrs, and battlefield glories.”
8
 Especially after a more dynamic market economy, 
urbanization, and a burgeoning railroad and communication network brought more prosperity 
to the South during Reconstruction, sentiments of the Southern elite united the South from 
                                                          
5. Michael Kammen, Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation of Tradition in American Culture (New 
York, Knopf, 1991), 115. 
 
6. Gaines M. Foster, Ghosts of the Confederacy: Defeat, the Lost Cause, and the Emergence of the New South 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 35. 
 
7. In Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of Modern America, 1877-1920 (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 
historian Jackson Lears provides an intriguing look at the masculinity that gave rise to the Lost Cause 
movement. After the Civil War, argues Lears, the violence and masculinity of war could not be recreated. Thus, 
as Southerners looked to fill this void, memorialization of the grand exploits of the Confederacy’s heroes 
became a coping mechanism as a new American character of rebirth emerged. Southerners regenerated their 
images in the glory, violence, and masculine heroics of the Civil War in order to overcome their recent defeat 
and the immense loss of American lives.   
 
8. Foster, Ghosts of the Confederacy, 35; quote from Kammen, Mystic Chords of Memory, 115. 
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the top down. The Lost Cause caught like a “contagion” of Confederate glory and has 
persisted in American memory for well over a century.
9 
 
The collective memory of World War II and the Nazis in Germany however, despite 
its more broad likeness to the American South, differs greatly. Unlike in the South, Germany 
was unable to repel their Allied occupiers and was pressured, largely by those occupiers, into 
a type of amnesia that overlooked the historical formation of recent German society and 
politics. This is also highly contrasted with the years prior to the war. Historian Rudy Koshar 
argues that the Weimar Republic participated in an overt decentralization and dynamic 
distancing from war memory after World War I while the Nazis, once they had seized power, 
recentralized war memory around existing war memorials, literature, and military cemeteries 
to promote their militaristic and nationalistic agenda of racial conquest. Cemetery and 
monument guidebooks and a Heroes Commemoration Day all became commonplace as the 
Nazis sought national unity just as many Southerners did after the conclusion of the Civil 
War.
10
 However, once Berlin fell to the Soviets and Germans all over Europe surrendered, all 
questionable aspects of German history quickly became taboo subjects, making Hitler and 
the Nazis the paradigm of evil in the modern world ever since.   
The ability of the occupier to maintain ideological, political, and social power over 
the defeated society is the key difference between the paths that German and Southern 
historical memory took in the years immediately following the wars. But as time passed in 
                                                          
9. Use of the word “contagion” comes from Michael Kammen’s Mystic Chords of Memory where he gives 
discussion to the memorialization movement in the South that “marked the most notable period in all of 
American history” for remembering soldiers, martyrs, and battlefield glories following the American Civil War. 
Here the word is used to talk not only of memorialization, but also of the larger Lost Cause movement itself. 
Kammen, Mystic Chords of Memory, 115. 
 
10. Rudy Koshar, From Monuments to Traces: Artifacts of German Memory, 1870-1990 (Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 2000), 116-117, 154. 
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both the United States and Germany, memory was constantly challenged by new generations 
thus altering both societies’ outlook on their troubled past through a dynamic process of 
competing recollections. This varied regionally to a large degree and different demographics 
remained highly selective on what was retained and what was reconstructed, but support for 
the Lost Cause waned and more German nationals sought to confront their troubled past. 
This is in fact due to the time that had elapsed since the actual conflicts as the war 
generations in both the American South and Germany had declined in numbers. Also, a series 
of wars (the Spanish American War and World War I for the South and the Cold War for 
Germany) and new international political aspirations helped focus members of each society 
on common enemies and future aspirations that left World War II and the Civil War in the 
past. However, Lost Cause memory of the Confederacy and German forgetfulness among 
many nationals continued as intense racism and anti-Semitism remained in both societies. 
Romantic war films and novelizations also propagandized the United States and Germany as 
popular culture swiftly became the leader in the memory-making process with the high 
influence of the film industry during the mid-twentieth century. Undeniably, the Lost Cause 
and German forgetfulness have remained strong sentiments in both the South and 
Germany—unfortunately the myths that were created about each society’s role in the major 
wars persist to this day.   
Not until recently have both the American South and Germany taken more seriously 
the debate about how to best remember their previous societies. However, this time both 
focus heavily on memorials. The argument centers on both sides’ understanding that there are 
perpetrators, victims, as well as reasons to understand the feelings that certain monuments 
will foster. Thus a battle rages over who should be remembered and how, and one cannot 
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help but notice similar arguments presented in both the South and Germany, despite their 
geographical distance. On one hand, the perpetrators must be memorialized so that history 
and its atrocities can be confronted, while on the other, the victims’ suffering merits 
documentation to provide a source of empowerment for the descendants. But this too, is very 
convoluted. In the South for instance, memorials still remain from the Lost Cause 
memorialization movement that glorify Confederate soldiers and engender feelings of disgust 
within many African Americans. While this largely remains a problem that Germany does 
not face—outside of vague neo-Nazi movements and a weak National Socialist party of 
government—enough Southerners still stand behind the representation of “heritage” that 
those memorials denote as to not allow their removal—no matter how romantic the historical 
interpretation. Both societies’ modern memorialization movements thus contain certain 
aspects that must be reconsidered to point out the historical significance of the events and the 
resulting hypocrisy, no matter how far in the past those events took place. The process of 
memory has reshaped, but also carried the Lost Cause and forgetfulness into the modern era 
in such a way that it is becoming more difficult for the average citizen to separate fact from 
fiction within their own recollections and values. Sympathy, understanding, and progress all 
need to be striven for as members of the United States and Germany confront the horrific 
offenses from their pasts.  
Confronting those offenses, however, can take place in many mediums. First, both the 
American South and Germany need to look to the occupations of outside governments that 
immediately took place on their lands following defeat. Examining the thoroughness of 
Union and Allied control over reconstruction, politics, and discourse will illuminate the 
opportunities that Southerners and Germans had to control the construction of war memory. 
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In this comparison, the options afforded by the occupiers were starkly different. The South, 
for instance, was able to overthrow centralized Reconstruction by the Union and regain 
control of memory through memorialization, intellectual scholarship, and supplanting 
Republican politicians with Southern Democrats. Germany, however, did not have such an 
opportunity based on the Allies’ ability to assume total control over the state. 
Memorialization campaigns, scholarship, and politics all favored the opinions of Germany’s 
occupiers in a way that diminished the “average German’s” role in the Holocaust and World 
War II. But even though Germans tended to omit their dealings with the Nazis while 
Southerners clung to their Confederate roots, mythicization of Southern and German 
righteousness was commonplace despite the historical differences. Eventually the 
interpretations forged in the years following the war were solidified by popular culture. 
Therefore, by examining those cultural structures that indicate historical memory—
memorials, politics, literature, and cinema—one can begin to flesh out the similarities and 
differences between the memory making process of two defeated nations that most would 
agree have very dark pasts.    
Examining these similarities and differences therefore can increase the understanding 
of memory in the human experience as well as reveal the damning effects of lost 
perspectives. However, when making such a comparison there are certain preconditions that 
must be kept in mind at all times: first, it is necessary that the entities in question be 
considered within their own unique historical contexts and time periods. Otherwise, the 
cultural intricacies, events, and processes that led to their development will be skewed. 
Remember, different histories always contain very important differences.  Second, one must 
keep in mind that this study focuses on the American South when it was part of the United 
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States and Germany when it was split into separate nations and only recently unified. In other 
words, Germany has had multiple forms of government whereas the U.S. has only had one. 
And third, as when comparing metaphorical apples to oranges, one cannot help but notice 
that the two are still fruits. Significant historical generalizations can be drawn from the 
similarities, and the varying degrees to which violent atrocities and social injustices are 
remembered in the human condition can be critically assessed—an important notion that the 
litany of previous scholarship on memory in the American South and Germany has not 
addressed.
10 
 
 
 
 
HISTORICAL MEMORY OF THE CIVIL WAR AND ANTEBELLUM SOCIETY IN THE 
AMERICAN SOUTH 
W.J. Cash has been touted as what many would call a disturbed genius. Growing up 
in the Piedmont of North Carolina during the early twentieth century, he was raised by 
deeply religious parents while also struggling with constant bouts of neurasthenia, 
depression, and alcohol addiction. Always a scholar, Cash learned to fight through his 
disabilities at an early age and went on to attend the liberal-leaning Wake Forest College 
before traveling through Europe and pursuing a writing career at several different 
newspapers. His big break came after H.L. Mencken, founder of the Baltimore based 
American Mercury, read one of Cash’s biting articles about the Democratic leadership of 
North Carolina and encouraged the twenty-nine-year-old to write a grand history of the 
American South. The project took Cash five years to finish, and upon completion, acclaim 
for The Mind of the South was high. Hailed by the likes of the N.A.A.C.P., Time, and The 
New York Times, Cash’s life appeared to have taken a positive turn as he subsequently 
married and received a Guggenheim Fellowship to write a novel in Mexico City.  But once in 
the public eye, Cash could not escape criticism. Native Southerners scolded Cash for his 
disparaging interpretation of their culture, violence, racism, religiosity, and blind pride—a 
11 
 
devastating blow to a man of  troubled mentality that resulted in the return of his mental 
unrest, violent mood fluctuations, and eventual suicide by hanging.
1 
  
Even though Cash clearly had problems that merited clinical help, his life story 
illustrates an important dichotomy that exists within the Southern experience. On one hand, 
he was highly critical and often scathing of Southern culture as he established what 
subsequent historians have called the “Savage Ideal”: “an assortment of half-digested truths” 
that, during Reconstruction, saturated Southern memory with notions of intense 
individualism, puritanism, and romanticism that cemented a firm belief in antebellum 
hierarchical values in the “Southern Way of Life.”
2
 So deeply ingrained were these beliefs, 
Cash believed, that “dissent and variety [were] completely suppressed, and men became, in 
all their attitudes, professions and actions, virtual replicas of one another.”
3
 But on the other 
hand, as a native son of North Carolina, he was still a product of the exact Southern culture 
that he spoke against. And despite his differing opinion, Cash could not escape “The South” 
that was created in resentment and defeat in the Civil War, nor did he want to. Instead, he 
wrote with “love and desperation” in an attempt to educate the region on its mythical 
histories and senseless white pride.
4
 Only when his Southern peers rejected his message was 
Cash mortally wounded. Thus, is the duality of Southern memory as it can be inferred by his 
life: a dynamic combination of narratives and identities that compete for acceptance, often 
                                                          
1. Joseph L. Morrison, W.J. Cash: Southern Prophet-A Biography and Reader (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1967), 3-60. For a closer look at the life and impact of W.J. Cash consult Bruce Clayton’s, W.J. Cash: A Life 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991). 
 
2. Bruce Clayton, The Savage Ideal: Intolerance and Intellectual Leadership in the South, 1890-1914 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), 2. 
 
3. Wilbur J. Cash, The Mind of the South (New York: Knopf, 1941; New York: Vintage Books, 1991), 90. 
 
4. Fred Hobson, Tell About the South: The Southern Rage to Explain (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1983), 185-186. 
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failing, but are yet still part of the same honorable, overarching culture that superseded the 
individual state pride of 1861.   
Despite his book’s success, Southern memory of the Old South in the early twentieth 
century, and the pride that stemmed from it, destroyed Cash—just as dominant Southern 
memory had been doing to every derisive interpretation of the South for several decades to 
that point. First, defeated and embarrassed white Southerners fashioned the Lost Cause—a 
mythical interpretation of the Old South and the war years that defined the South as a 
geographically and culturally superior region populated by chivalrous cavaliers and “happy 
darkies” and that was ultimately defeated in a war prompted by a Constitutional debate over 
states’ rights and Northern aggression—to fill the void that was left among the rubble and 
economic ruin following the Civil War. This then resulted in the touchy pride, racism, and 
paternalism that downplayed the severity of institutionalized slavery, depicted African 
Americans as ignorant and barbarous, and ultimately led to the egregious Jim Crow laws 
(despite white supremacy being considered the “cornerstone” of Southern society prior to the 
war). The Lost Cause then continued as it dominated popular memory by heralding heroic 
defenders of their homeland (such as Robert E. Lee, “Stonewall Jackson,” and the multitudes 
of common soldiers) while silencing alternate interpretations in academia, politics and 
popular culture.
5 
  
                                                          
5. Edward L. Ayers, “Review of Bruce Clayton’s W.J. Cash: A Life, The Journal of American History 78 
(1992): 1493; W.J. Cash, The Mind of the South (New York: Vintage, 1991), 66; Robert Penn Warren, The 
Legacy of the Civil War (Winnipeg: Bison Books, 1998), 15; Bertram Wyatt-Brown, “W.J. Cash and Southern 
Culture,” in Walter J. Fraser and Winfred B. Moore, eds., From the Old South to the New: Essays on the 
Transitional South (Westport and London: Greenwood Press, 1981), 199; James C. Cobb, Away Down South: A 
History of Southern Identity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 62-63, 212; Alexander H. Stephens, 
“The Confederate Cornerstone Speech,” March 21, 1861; quoted in Kenneth Stampp, ed., The Causes of the 
Civil War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991). Since the Lost Cause focused mainly on the eastern theater of 
the war, it cites Gettysburg as the turning point and does not view Lieutenant General James Longstreet’s 
skepticism of General Lee at Gettysburg and Major General George Pickett’s charge with particular fondness.  
Instead, those dedicated to the Cause believed that those generals’ ineptitude led to the disastrous result at 
13 
 
 
Origins of the Lost Cause: 
The Lost Cause myth that has dominated Southern memory can be traced back to the 
end of the Civil War when the South’s economy and infrastructure lay in ruin. According to 
Catherine Bishir and W. Fitzhugh Brundage, this began with a period of memorialization that 
first consisted of simple decorations and monuments in local cemeteries—a process hastened 
largely by white upper-class women and their exploitation of “conventions” of “feminine 
deference.” Subsequently, this popular practice among prominent females evolved into a full-
fledged memorial movement. Southern women such as Mary Dunbar Williams of 
Winchester, Virginia—the first female to fund a Confederate cemetery in 1865—battled, 
manipulated, and cunningly operated within the masculine, Victorian values of her time to 
assume curatorial authority over monument building, historical archives, museums, and 
almost all other space needed to accommodate Southern memorialization campaigns 
throughout the South.
6  
    
On the heels of these initial successes, Southern women organized highly influential 
Ladies Memorial Associations, and, as word spread, emotional pleas by historical societies 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Gettysburg and the South’s eventual demise. As an example of the excitement that Robert E. Lee generated in 
the South, take this excerpt from a Charleston, South Carolina, newspaper article titled with his name: “The 
gallant soldier and distinguished patriot whose name heads this article, arrived in the city yesterday afternoon.  
Charleston may well be proud of the honor of having in her midst so brave a defender of the cause she loved so 
well…We shall never forget the cause in behalf of which he struggled so manfully, and as long as the memory 
of the dark and gloomy days of war lingers in our hearts we shall always cherish the memory of Robert E. Lee.” 
Robert E. Lee vignette taken from “General Robert E. Lee,” Charleston Courier, Tri-Weekly, April 28, 1870, 
Col. B. 
 
6. Catherine W. Bishir, “’A Strong Force of Ladies:’ Women, Politics, and Confederate Memorial Associations 
in Nineteenth-Century Raleigh,” North Carolina Historical Review 77 (2000): 456; W. Fitzhugh Brundage, 
“’Woman’s Hands and Heart  and Deathless Love:’ White Women and the Commemorative Impulse in the New 
South,” in Monuments to the Lost Cause: Women, Art, and the Landscapes of Southern Memory, by Cynthia 
Mills and Pamela H. Simpson, eds. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2003), 64-78; Caroline E. 
Janney, Burying the Dead But Not the Past: Ladies’ Memorial Associations and the Lost Cause (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 39-40. 
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and newspapers began to declare that all women in the South should seek similar endeavors. 
Within a year, seventy such organizations functioned throughout the South—from Virginia to 
Alabama—creating not only a consolidated womanhood among Southern white women, but 
also the impetus for the larger Confederate Memorial Movement that incorporated powerful 
female organizations such as the United Daughters of the Confederacy with male-dominated 
organizations such as the North Carolina Monumental Association and the Southern 
Historical Society. Take for example the rhetorical question posed by the memorial 
association of Emory & Henry College (located in Emory, Virginia) in 1869: “Would you 
cherish the memory of the Confederate dead? Then please remit some small contribution, one 
dollar or more…for the purpose of adorning and taking care of their graves.”
7
 White 
Southern solidarity swept across the region further polarizing the North and South via a new 
cause of nobility and emotional character. But as the business of memorial associations 
focused on memorializing Southern leaders and the many fallen private soldiers who served 
in defense of their homelands, the origins of the Lost Cause movement were simultaneously 
receiving support from other, more direct, outlets.
8
 
 Virginia natives Edward Pollard, editor of the Richmond Examiner, and Lieutenant 
General Jubal A. Early, a former general in the Army of Northern Virginia, served to provide 
the voice of the young Lost Cause movement and its romantic memorialization campaigns by 
aligning themselves directly with their recent past. While the two had similar views, Pollard 
                                                          
7. Marylou Anderson Cory, The Ladies’ Memorial Association of Montgomery, Alabama: Its Origin and 
Organization 1860-1870 (Montgomery: Alabama Printing Company, 1902), 47; “Record of Confederate Dead 
Emory Cemetery,” Emory & Henry College, Washington Co., VA, May, 1869, Kelly Library of Emory & 
Henry College Archives. 
 
8. Confederated Southern Memorial Association, History of the Confederated Memorial Associations of the 
South (New Orleans: The Graham Press, 1904), 290. A brief note on the memorialization of the Confederacy’s 
common soldiers: one, so long as they have spent significant time in the South, need only to consult their own 
memories as they have surely glimpsed the ubiquitous bronze sculpture of “Johnny Reb” with his rifle, lightly 
filled haversack, and valorous resolve that adorns countless town squares. 
15 
 
became the first to pen the Lost Cause ideals in the Southern History of the War (1866). His 
Southern history established what historians Gary Gallagher and Alan Nolan believe to be 
the cornerstone of the Confederate point of view under the Lost Cause: 
The occasion of that conflict was what the Yankees called—by one of their 
convenient libels in political nomenclature—slavery; but what was in fact 
nothing more than a system of Negro servitude in the South…one of the 
mildest and most beneficent systems of servitude in the world.
9
 
Only two years later, however, Pollard’s language became undeniably more political and 
provided the first “full-blown, argumentative statement…with respect to all aspects of the 
Civil War” from the white Southern perspective in The Lost Cause: A New Southern History 
of the War and The Lost Cause Regained.
10
 
Pollard’s Lost Cause also marked the first usage of the phrase “the Lost Cause” 
(thereby providing the historical memory’s name) and, according to the author, was the first 
“full and authentic account of the rise and progress of the late Southern Confederate” that 
was authenticated by the former leaders of the Confederacy. However, only a year earlier in 
1867, Jubal Early—who had previously fled to Mexico, Cuba, and finally Canada—
published A Memoir of the Last Year of the War for Independence: In the Confederate States 
of America.
11
 The central messages of the two books, despite Early’s focus on the 
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Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1864 (his most important campaign and noted failure), 
were eerily similar: both claimed to oppose secession at the outset of the war. They blamed 
Lincoln and his cabinet for aggressively overthrowing the Constitution and recognized the 
“right of resistance and revolution” as proclaimed by the founding fathers.
12
  
The first chapter of Pollard’s Lost Cause actually summarizes what both he and Early 
believed regarding Northern despotism and Southern secession in a discussion about the 
merits of the Magna Carta’s limitations on central authority in the government. Pollard 
argues: the civil institutions of the States were “already perfect and satisfactory.” The “Union 
was nothing more than a convenience of the States”—created out of mutual liberty and 
equality—that had no mission apart from them.
13
 In other words, Pollard espouses that 
secession was a long-standing and common-sense right of the states granted by the 
Constitution (assertions that were supported with a discussion of the Virginia and Kentucky 
Resolutions authored by James Madison and Thomas Jefferson). Thus, Pollard and Early 
played a large role in framing Southerners as victims of the North and Washington D.C. and 
successfully shifted the discussion regarding the cause of the Civil war from slavery to states’ 
rights.   
And while Pollard furthered this notion by writing that the North had misrepresented 
a benign system of servitude as a harsh institution of slavery, it was Early who was the most 
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passionate white supremacist. He believed that under slavery the “ignorant and barbarous 
natives of Africa” lived in a “civilized and Christianized condition” that was not only 
humane, but beneficial to their race, thus justifying the peculiar institution and separating its 
protection from Southern motivations during the war.
14
 In his opinion, as would become the 
accepted interpretation under the Lost Cause, “slavery was the mere occasion of the 
development of the antagonism between the two sections.” The North was the aggressor and 
used the term as a “catchword to arouse the passions of a fanatical mob.” The South, instead, 
was forced to fight in order to uphold the Constitution and to preserve their right to self- 
government—a right that, along with slavery, was “violently abolished” at the war’s end.
15
 
Similarly, Pollard’s recounting of South Carolina Senator John Calhoun’s 1831 
response to Massachusetts Senator Daniel Webster (Massachusetts) amid the Nullification 
Crisis only further epitomized what was becoming the post-war stance of the South. “If the 
General Government and a State come into conflict”—as was the case when tensions 
surrounding the “Abomination Tariffs” of 1828 and 1832 that hampered the South’s ability 
to buy and trade goods compounded the national division over slavery—“…the power which 
called the General Government into existence, which gave it all of its authority…may be 
invoked.” The states themselves must then vote on the constitutionality of the source of 
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tension thereby determining a victor by a three-fourths majority. This appeal to the “only 
solid foundation” of the Union—by a pro-slavery South Carolina Senator no less—was the 
hyperbolic tool that Pollard used to demonstrate statesmanship and the belief that the South 
attempted to elude secession. Only the shallow pages of Northern books could have skewed 
Senator Calhoun’s attempt to save the Union as “Nullification” and labeled the war of 1861 
as a “Southern Rebellion.” Instead, as Pollard and Early espoused, the Civil War was 
“brought on by Northern insurgents against the authority of the Constitution;” a fact, as they 
believed, it would take the world long to realize.
16
 
But the two men were wrong; it would not take long for the messages of their lengthy 
treatises to be realized as the South waged a “war of ideas” against North and the “Black 
Republican Party.”
17
 Despite the disfranchisement of the Southern class, black suffrage being 
forced on the region, and the governing “of the Southern states as conquered and subjugated 
territories,” the social and intellectual South must unite, with a firmer resolve, in a renewed 
“struggle against the North,” Pollard declared.
18 
This clarion call coincided with, and was 
partly answered by, the memorialization movement that Early greatly influenced during the 
1870s via the Southern Historical Society Papers. As similar journals were therefore 
engendered throughout the South to combat Early’s strict Virginia-centric interpretation of 
the war and to give voice to former Confederates outside of the eastern theater, the 
movement was consolidated under this message in 1900: 
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To future generations of the people of the South and to the sons and daughters 
of the women of the Confederacy, who first banded themselves together in 
memorial work, may this Confederation carry its messages and legacy of 
devotion to the memory of a Cause and the heroes who fought for it, the 
Deathless Dead of the Southern Confederacy.
19
 
 
As Gary Gallagher writes, “[Early] understood almost immediately…that there would be a 
struggle to control the public memory of war.” And for the white South, there were still 
“noble victories to be won, memorable services to be performed, and grand results to be 
achieved” as Pollard added.
20 
But in combination with the memorial movement, these two 
native sons of Virginia helped engender and preserve a positive memory of the Confederacy 
that ran opposite Northern and African American interpretations and took the first steps to 
ensure that their version of events became the official one for years to come.
21 
     
 Despite the influence of the Virginia writers and ability of the Memorialization 
movement to provide ex-Confederates with the public opportunity to valorize the greater 
sacrifice that their culture and heritage endured during the Civil War, the Lost Cause was 
solidified in Southern memory by a far more overt means: political insurrection.
22
 The Red 
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Shirts, as they became known for their attire, were a politically minded, paramilitary group 
that arose during Reconstruction with the goals of supplanting all Republican politicians in 
the South and repressing the civil rights of African Americans through terrorism and political 
pressure.
23
 The violence associated with the group became legendary throughout the South, 
but, according to historian Bruce E. Baker, the Red Shirt’s greatest victory was won during 
South Carolina’s 1876 gubernatorial election—when their exploits resulted in the election of 
former Confederate cavalry leader Wade Hampton.
24
 
 “Hurrah for Hampton!” supporters cried as the former Confederate was declared a 
statesman (though he did have to fight significant political opposition from other ex-
Confederates throughout his political career).
25
 But Wade Hampton was more than a 
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politician that sought to empower white Democrats and their laissez-faire economic policies; 
he was South Carolina’s first Democratic governor since the end of the war and a symbol of 
Southern “Redemption.” Despite Hampton’s constant assurance that he saw his “colored 
friends” as equals and his assertions that he would put an end to violence throughout the 
state, make a motion toward better education for all, and welcome his brethren from the 
North for the “perpetuity of the Union,” he operated on the ticket of the Southern cause and 
was backed by an organization that was more than willing to go to great lengths to firmly 
establish the paternal and racial social hierarchies that it, and the Lost Cause, believed were 
destroyed by Northern intervention.
26
 Thus, once Hampton was in place, the Lost Cause 
myth garnered influence over public policy and discourse, and South Carolina was able to 
mirror the voter registration reforms (such as Mississippi and Alabama’s literacy tests, poll 
taxes, and vagrancy laws) that had already stripped African Americans and poor whites of 
their voting privileges throughout the rest of the South. One of the only remaining Southern 
states that had not yet been taken over by Democratic party-rule, and one of the final hopes 
for the Republican Party in the South, was therefore redeemed in the ways of antebellum 
social hierarchies.
27 
  
As a result, the Red Shirts were revered throughout the South as the saviors of South 
Carolina and gained momentum as they spread into neighboring states (specifically North 
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Carolina). African American and Northern interpretations of the Civil War and old South 
were then drowned out by tales of Confederate glory, and two notorious political issues came 
once again to dominate each state in the Southern polity: states’ rights and race. As Baker 
contends, Lost Cause advocates claimed the political sphere in the South with Hampton’s 
victory in South Carolina, and the memory of Northern despotism and black incompetence 
they infused became “as close to hegemonic as any part of American historical memory had 
ever been.” It is no accident that Jim Crow, the institutionalized system of racial inferiority 
based on African American disfranchisement and public segregation, came to exist the very 
year Hampton was elected. So strong were the ideas of the Southern redeemers, that 
institutionalized racism lasted nearly a century before being deemed unconstitutional. 
Therefore, Jim Crow—and the civil rights movement that sought to overturn it—owes much 
to the racial and political components of the Lost Cause and their solidification in Southern, 
single-party politics during the latter half of the nineteenth century.
28 
        
Perpetuating the Myth of the Lost Cause: 
 It is no secret among academics that memory creation in the South following the Civil 
War was not a simple process. In fact, as W. Fitzhugh Brundage’s Where These Memories 
Grow: History, Memory, and Southern Identity brings to light, the South contained numerous 
memories and identities that competed for acceptance: white and black, male and female, 
gays and straights, Hispanic, Anglo, Appalachian, Cajun, and Native American. For instance, 
Kathleen Clark describes how African Americans used Emancipation Day celebrations 
during Reconstruction to “promote their own interpretations of history…that variously 
stressed both the memory of slavery and the evolution of black progress” while at the turn of 
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the twentieth century a new class of black leaders was forming behind the NAACP and 
intellectuals such as W.E.B. Dubois and Booker T. Washington.
29
 Even later in the twentieth 
century—after such major events as the Progressive movement, the Spanish-American War, 
and World War I had shifted memory in the United States to a less polarized, more 
nationalistic focus—intellectuals such as U.B. Phillips, Kenneth Stampp, Stanley Elkins, 
Eugene Genovese, and Herbert Gutman consistently challenged the states’ rights 
interpretation of the war, reframed the benignity of the peculiar institution and romanticism 
of the South, and worked diligently to redefine white supremacy and race relations as the 
“central theme of Southern history” (an academic trend that has its roots in the new breed of 
Southern historian that emerged in the South during the 1890s).
30
 Thus, Americans of all 
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types proclaimed distinct versions of themselves, their nation, and of liberty that differed 
from the Lost Cause myth while, in the case of African Americans, occupying previously 
prohibited public spaces within a society that predominantly looked at blacks as incompetent 
savages. For instance, a racially charged article from 1868 clearly depicts African American 
derision of the Lost Cause by means of a “grand parade” that contained speeches, salutes to 
the Lincoln Memorial, and female dress that was meant to represent the “Goddess of 
Liberty” that all seemed to irritate the article’s white author.
31
 But despite the multitudes of 
what Bruce Baker calls “countermemories,” the Lost Cause antithesis created by African 
Americans, other minority groups, and many notable Southern historians was not able “to 
mount a credible challenge” to Lost Cause white supremacy until at least the 1950s, and even 
then did not prove truly redemptive as much of their message struggled to gain popular 
support.   
The strength of the Lost Cause was possible for many reasons, especially through 
child socialization as the educational initiatives of the newly founded Southern Educational 
Board made the public schools of the early twentieth century more readily available to 
Southern families. But despite increased student attendance and teacher regulations, the 
curriculum initiatives were largely seized by whites after the 1896 ruling in Plessy v. 
Ferguson, thereby making the content of the school curriculum heavily weighted toward a 
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Lost Cause agenda. For instance, rudimentary children’s story books and academic history 
books alike were commissioned by former Confederates to perpetuate old master-slave 
stereotypes that they saw as “true to the South” as Northern resources were cast aside. A Lost 
Cause dichotomy—portraying the Old South as a place where white men were the high-
status social group relative to African Americans and women—was forced on a new 
generation of Southerners as it was relegated to their childhood curriculums.
32
 But the 
socialization of the South’s children was by no means the only stronghold that the Lost 
Cause maintained. Radical groups such as the Red Shirts and KKK retained political and 
symbolic power, New South universities such as Sewanee and Washington & Lee became 
indoctrination centers for Lost Cause thought in the South, and many African American 
authorities maintained similar assertions to those of whites in several instances.
33
 In other 
words, through those means and well into the twentieth century, white Southerners were 
more successful in labeling “incendiary’’ and ‘‘conciliatory’’ African American 
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authorities—marginalizing the former and acknowledging the latter—thus shaping popular 
memory of the Civil War, the South, and Emancipation Day to the white advantage.
34
 Even if 
this was as simple as former Confederates staffing the journalism and law departments at 
Washington & Lee University, or authoring books expressing Lost Cause viewpoints that 
became readily available for children before they were ready for higher education, historian 
David Blight’s contention remains: “those who can create the dominant historical narrative, 
[and] those who can own the public memory, will achieve political and cultural power” and 
the right to forge historical discourse—which was accomplished by the dominant Southern 
white class.
35 
  
But by far the most pervasive accelerator of the Lost Cause myth in Southern memory 
was popular culture—due to the fact that many Southern people lacked significant access to 
intellectual and political outlets such as institutions of higher education and local 
government. As early as the 1870s, Southern antebellum and postbellum writers alike were 
elevated under the glory of the Lost Cause—for example, Paul Hamilton Hayne (“the last 
literary Cavalier”) and Sidney Lanier’s poems about fallen Confederates and Southern 
beauty.
36
 However, most important, is poet Henry Timrod (often referred to as the Poet 
Laureate of the Confederacy in his home state of South Carolina). Even though he died in 
1867, Timrod’s close friend and fellow poet, Hayne, posthumously edited and published a 
collection of Timrod’s most famous poems in 1873. Included was “Ode, Sung on the 
Occasion of Decorating the Graves of the Confederate Dead at Magnolia Cemetery, 
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Charleston, South Carolina, 1867” and “The Cotton Boll.” Referred to more commonly as 
“Ode,” the former is Timrod’s most direct link to the Lost Cause as it is charged with 
emotion and served as one of the first eulogies for dead Confederates.
37
 “Sleep sweetly in 
your humble graves; / Sleep, Martyrs of a fallen cause,” the poem reads.  “Stoop, angels, 
hither from the skies! / There is no holier spot of ground / Than where defeated valor 
lies…”
38
 That, however, is not to diminish the romance and nostalgia of “The Cotton Boll” 
that also appealed to advocates of the Cause. In it, Timrod wrote in fear that the South’s 
“seas of billowy gold” and “sacred fields of peace” would be destroyed by the encroaching 
war. Not even “Carolina”—adopted as the South Carolina state song in 1911 and discussed 
the exulting of Confederate dead and Northern despotism—could equal the imagery and anti-
Northern opinion of “The Cotton Boll”:  
“Oh, help us Lord! To Roll the Crimson Flood  
Back on its course…  
Northward, strike with us! till the Goth shall cling  
To his own blasted alter-stones, and crave   
                                                          
37. Ibid., 283-289. Hayne’s and Timrod’s friendship and Timrod’s Southern legacy is well documented in 
Metchalf’s American Literature, but “Ode, Sung on the Occasion of Decorating the Graves of the Confederate 
Dead at Magnolia Cemetery, Charleston, South Carolina, 1867,” inspired numerous adaptations that carry 
legacies of their own. For instance, Mary Ashley Townsend’s 1874 “Ode to the Confederate Dead, Buried in 
Greenwood Cemetery” was dedicated to the Women’s Benevolent Association of Louisiana and read: “Meet 
here to tell the story / Of heroes’ lives, that passed from earth / On Southern fields of glory…So would it seem 
the noble hearts / That wrought this work of love, / Required no earthly change to fit / Them for the realms 
above…Oh, Marble Sentry! Guard them well, / These Children of a nation,— / We leave them to the stars and 
thee, / Grand in their desolation.” The above poem is found in The Confederated Southern Memorial 
Association, History of the Confederated Memorial Associations of the South, 178-180.    
 
38. Henry Timrod, “Ode, Sung on the Occasion of Decorating the Graves of the Confederate Dead at Magnolia 
Cemetery, Charleston, South Carolina, 1867,” in Paul H. Payne, ed., The Poems of Henry Timrod (New York: 
E.J. Hale & Son, 1873), 210-211. 
 
28 
 
Mercy; and we shall grant it…
39
   
 During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, poets like Timrod and Hayne 
would join color writer Thomas Nelson Page, “the exalter nonpareil of the Old South” and 
alumnus of Washington & Lee University, as major purveyors of Lost Cause tenets to the 
larger Southern audience.
40
 But while Page wrote mostly of old distinguished Southern 
families, plantation life, and the kind relations between master and slave, he also found an 
ally and friend in the most heralded proponent of the New South—journalist Henry Woodfin 
Grady—due to Grady’s anti-apologetic attitude regarding the Confederacy. Together the two 
spoke not only of the glorious antebellum years and the sacrifices that the South was forced 
to make during war, but also used the Lost Cause to look forward as a region separate from 
the socioeconomic paradigm of the plantation system that was built on slave and plantation 
labor. As Grady and Page both declared, the New South “was simply the Old South with its 
energies directed into new lines.”
41
 But unlike slavery, writes Grady, white supremacy “must 
be maintained forever, and the domination of the negro race resisted at all points and at all 
hazards.”42 The New South under these popular writers was a revival of the Old South, a 
simple adaptation of the Lost Cause that enabled it to further cement itself in popular 
memory well into the twentieth century. Grady and Page, like many Southerners living 
                                                          
39. Henry Timrod, “The Cotton Boll,” in Hayne, The Poems of Henry Timrod, 125-131. Timrod’s negative 
opinion of the Union is evident in the last lines of the poem.  By associating them with Goths and alter stones, 
Timrod is correlating the North with pagans that will corrupt Southern culture and the landscape. The South, 
however, will find it in their hearts to grant mercy once their enemies have been defeated (a notion that it can be 
assumed that Timrod did not believe a Northern value).  
 
40. Metcalf, American Literature, 333. 
 
41. Thomas Nelson Page, The Old South: Essays Social and Political (New York: Charles Scribner’s and Sons, 
1892), 6. 
 
42. Henry W. Grady, “The New South” delivered to the New England Club of New York on December 22, 
1886, in Joel Chandler Harris, ed., The Life of Henry Grady, Including his Writing and Speeches (New York: 
1890,) 91, 83. 
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during their time, represented a new generation that had “inherited the spirit of the old” to 
which they were loyal and eager servants.
43
 
 The writings and the orations of Thomas Nelson and Henry Grady were influential 
and had longevity as their themes are still visible in literature during the 1930s. The most 
noticeable in popular histories was undoubtedly that by Douglas Southall Freeman, his 
highly acclaimed and exhaustively researched biography of Robert E. Lee. Many critics and 
historians referred to this 1936 work as a Lost Cause interpretation of the war and the 
General. This is due entirely to the Lost Cause tenets that he follows: the lauding of Lee; 
criticism of his subordinates, especially General James Longstreet for losing the war at 
Gettysburg due to his incompetence; and cementing Pollard and Early’s top-down, Virginia-
centric interpretation of the war in the twentieth century. But the biography’s crowning 
achievement was to create a bridge between academic and popular culture in the mid-
twentieth century that overshadowed every Civil War biography that followed.
44
   
                                                          
43. Quote from “Henry W. Grady Dead,” Albany News and Advertiser, in Harris, The Life of Henry Grady, 552. 
For additional information on the role of Grady and Nelson in perpetuating the Lost Cause into the New South 
refer to Metcalf, American Literature, 331-335, 307-308 and Paul M. Gaston, The New South Creed: A Study in 
Southern Mythmaking (Montgomery: New South Books, 2002), 27, 173. For primary sources by Henry W. 
Grady refer to his speeches “The South and Her Problem” delivered at the Dallas, Texas, State Fair on October 
26, 1867, in Harris, The Life of Henry Grady, 100 and “Before the Bay State Club—1889,” in Harris, The Life 
of Henry Grady, 200. For color writings by Thomas Nelson Page refer to Marse Chan: A Tale of Old Virginia 
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1892) and Meh Lady (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1884). 
 
44. Douglas S. Freeman, R.E. Lee A Biography, 4 Vols., (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1936); Douglas 
Southall Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenants, 3 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1942-44).  Douglas Southall 
Freeman was born in Lynchburg, Virginia, 1866. As he grew up just down the street from the residence of 
former Confederate General Jubal Early, he was highly influenced by his surroundings and took an abounding 
interest in Confederate history before obtaining his Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins University. His first major 
success was a book titled Lee’s Dispatches—published after he found lost wartime communications between 
Robert E. Lee and Confederate president Jefferson Davis while working for the Richmond Times-Dispatch—
that resulted in his becoming an overnight sensation and landing a deal with New York publisher Charles 
Scribner’s Sons to write a series of pieces, including the four volume biography, on General Lee. But despite R. 
E. Lee: A Biography winning a Pulitzer Prize, many of his critics still regarded his scholarship as a Lost Cause 
interpretation of the Civil War. For more information regarding the life of Douglas Southall Freeman and his 
impact on the Lost Cause refer to  David E. Johnson, Douglas Southall Freeman (Gretna: Pelican Publishing 
Company, 2002);; Richard Harwell, Lee: An Abridgement in One Volume of the Four-Volume R.E. LEE by 
Douglas Southall Freeman (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1961). 
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Popular histories, however, were only a small fraction of the Lost Cause rhetoric that 
permeated twentieth century popular culture. As the cinema industry grew, short stories, 
novels, and popular histories such as Freeman’s were no longer the only outlets for memory 
building in the South. No longer were written words the preeminent perpetuators of memory, 
as any person who had the means could sit in front of a movie screen and watch effortlessly 
as films displayed the romance and stunning imagery of the Lost Cause’s Old South and 
Civil War. Nowhere was this more pertinent, with regard to the South, than the legacy of 
nobility created by The Birth of a Nation (1915) and Gone with the Wind (1939). According 
to Thomas Dixon Jr., his novels Leopard’s Spots (1903) and The Clansman (1905) were 
attempts to “teach the north” about the depredations suffered in the South both before and 
after the war. But it was not until he met up with the young, ambitious filmmaker D.W. 
Griffith, in New York, that the two men’s similar visions of a fallen antebellum South—
comprised of chivalrous men, genteel Southern damsels, and contented slaves—could 
become a cultural reality imprinted on the historical conscience of the nation.
45 
  
The Birth of a Nation is the result of Dixon and Griffith’s landmark collaboration 
(based on Dixon’s The Clansman) and was acclaimed as a cinematic and historical 
masterpiece by movie critics of the early-twentieth century—which implies that if the Lost 
Cause interpretation of the Civil War had not yet been accepted throughout the nation, it was 
after the movie. “Piedmont, South Carolina,” the opening credits read, “where life runs in a 
quaintly way that is to be no more” as the old South was destroyed under the heel of the 
                                                          
45. D.W. Griffith made scores of melodramas during the early 1900s. Most, if not all, pertaining to the Civil 
War followed the same structure: nostalgic reminisces of the old South with brave Confederate soldiers spurred 
on by Northern advances and loyal, well cared for slaves willing to lay down their lives for their masters. In one 
such drama noted by David Blight, an older slave goes so far as to hide his master’s will in a tree because he 
cannot face its manumission clause.  
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North’s “millions of sturdy people and their exhaustless resources.”
46
 The movie then leads 
viewers to believe that battered Southern soldiers were then forced to return to their homes 
and faithful slaves, while Northerners, scalawags, and freedmen tore down their immaculate 
society in ignorant bliss. By the end of The Birth of a Nation, however, Dixon and Griffith 
had captured the sentiment of thousands as they either portrayed blacks as submissive and 
loyal while under the guidance of their white masters or beastly and animalistic while free. 
But whether slaves or freedmen, all blacks were less intelligent and inferior to whites in 
every way. Only former Confederates, who had been “baptized in glory,” could band 
together and save the South from “Negro Rule” and keep antebellum white supremacy 
intact.
47 
Eventually, as Dixon’s book and film suggest, the “Invisible Empire” of the Ku Klux 
Klan rose from “the field of Death” to save “the life of a people” by removing African 
Americans from politics. This was the Lost Cause that had been achieved politically by the 
Red Shirts decades earlier, but now, with the help of massive endorsements and advertising 
campaigns, The Birth of a Nation imprinted it the historical memory of the American 
populace.
48
   
However, carrying a longer legacy than The Birth of a Nation—due to the fact that its 
less overt racism made it more redeemable in the years after—is Margaret Mitchell’s 1936 
publication Gone with the Wind and the 1939 film of the same name. The widely popular and 
critically acclaimed novel and motion picture chronicle the story of Scarlett O’Hara, the well-
to-do daughter of a large plantation owner in Clayton County, Georgia, and her experiences 
                                                          
46. D.W. Griffith and Thomas Dixon Jr., The Birth of a Nation, DVD (New York: Epoch Producing Co., 1998) 
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47. Thomas Dixon Jr., “Personal Message to the Reader,” in The Clansman, page not numbered. 
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at the onset of the Civil War, Sherman’s March to the Sea, and attempts at regaining her 
wealth during Reconstruction. And like The Birth of a Nation, Howard’s film (in which 
Mitchell was deeply involved), which Alan Nolan refers to essentially as a statement of the 
Lost Cause, wastes no time conveying its memory as opening images display pristine 
Southern landscapes, plantation homes, lush crops and livestock, and the Confederate flag 
being flown over the statehouse in Atlanta as the following words scroll the screen: 
There was a land of Cavaliers and Cotton Fields called the Old South… Here 
in this pretty world Gallantry took its last bow…Here was the last ever to be 
seen of the Knights and their Ladies Fair, of Master and of Slave…Look for it 
only in books, for it is no more than a dream remembered. A Civilization gone 
with the wind…
49
 
Lost Cause depictions of Confederate soldiers, the paternal power of men, dainty Southern 
belles, and the resource superiority of the North also do not elude Gone with the Wind. At 
first, soon-to-be Confederate warriors resonate bravery and excitement as they prepare for 
the oncoming war, but after returning from battling an enemy that was better equipped with 
“factories, ship yards, coal mines, and a fleet [that could] bottle up [Southern] harbors,” as 
Rhett Butler asserts in the movie, the brave men of the South were left ragged, forlorn, 
wounded, and in few numbers. The North simply would not allow the South “to secede in 
peace,” the text reads, “and grimly they returned to the desolation that was once a land of 
grace and plenty.”
50 
  
                                                          
49. Gallagher and Nolan, The Myth of the Lost Cause, 30-31. Block quote from Sidney Howard and Victor 
Fleming, Gone with the Wind, DVD (Burbank: Warner Bros. Entertainment, 2009) [orig. rel. 1939]. The images 
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Gone with the Wind’s portrayal of African Americans and slavery is again the most 
controversial as it, like the Lost Cause of what initiated the Civil War, only uses the peculiar 
institution as the backdrop to a story about other things. In this setting, like in The Birth of a 
Nation, slavery is essentially portrayed as a benign institution, and the slaves themselves are 
seen as less-intelligent and submissive to their white masters.
51
 Aside from the stereotype of 
slaves being content and indebted to their master-slave relationship, the most obvious 
stereotype in all of Mitchell’s and Dixon’s novels and movies is the Mammy—an old, 
rotund, and aggressive house maid—as she plays on a sense of nostalgia that was already 
prevalent in Southern fiction. In other words, the memory of Mammy was a pleasant one. A 
memory that a 1915 children’s book titled My Old Black Mammy said only “lived on in the 
tales that are told of those ‘dear dread days beyond recall,’” and in faithfulness and devotion, 
“left a lasting imprint on human service” that would be lauded by the sons of former masters 
and “the old negroes” themselves—“endless and absolute.”
52
 Mammy, as well as field slaves, 
was utterly devoted to her master and seemingly shunned the idea of freedom to remain 
subservient and content as a lesser individual of a “natural order” in the memory of the 
South.
53
 
                                                          
51. Female slaves were especially stereotyped with Lost Cause concepts.  Not only were they submissive to 
Scarlett (and she was allowed to hit them), but male characters often looked down upon them with inferiority as 
if they were cute children attempting to understand the larger world around them.  At one point in the movie, 
Scarlett’s father is addressing the way in which she treats Mammy: “You must be firm with inferiors, but you 
must be gentle; especially with darkies.” Ibid.   
  
52. Ibid., Margaret Mitchell, Gone with the Wind (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936), 844; James W. 
Elliot, My Old Black Mammy (New York: The Man Message Corporation, 1915), page not numbered. 
 
53. James Elliot’s 1915 children’s book writes the following of the Mammy stereotype: “Way back in the dark 
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Despite NAACP protests surrounding both movies, most white Southerners turned to 
these films and books for their educations on the Old South and the Civil War. Famous 
playwright Larry L. King (best known for the Broadway hit “The Best Little Whorehouse in 
Texas”) recalls that he had never heard of African American leaders such as W.E.B. Dubois 
or their achievements during his childhood in the 1930s. “Nowhere was it hinted that black 
people had played sustaining roles in our national history or made significant contributions to 
our culture,” wrote King. Instead, he and his white peers “marched to the Yucca Theater to 
be educated by Gone with the Wind” during an American history class.
54
 This is evidence of 
Carolyn Perry’s and Marry Louise Weaks’ contention that The Birth of a Nation and Gone 
with the Wind were the best reference points for subsequent writers (both white and black) of 
the American South during the twentieth century.
55
 The impact of those two movies can even 
be seen in almost every subsequent depiction of the Civil War in movies and novels (see 
Mackinlay Kantor’s Lee and Grant at Appomattox, Michael Shaara’s The Killer Angels, and 
the films Shenandoah and Gettysburg), popular biographies and histories, 1950s and 1960s 
Rock and Roll (such as Elvis Presley’s Love Me Tender, a derivative of Civil War era song 
Aura Lea) and modern-day reenactments. Those two movies have created a “usable past” 
which Americans can employ over and over to reflect the biases that exist in their own 
memories and agendas. For instance, as historian Gary Gallagher argues, nearly every 
interpretation of the Civil War during the twentieth century has reused Dixon’s and 
Mitchell’s historical interpretation by treating Lee and Southern patriarchs more fairly than 
Grant and the North. Appearances of President Grant on screen are minimal compared to 
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Lee, and, if not being portrayed poorly as a haggard drunk, then his character is merely a 
background figure.
56 
The Civil War in particular, writes historian Jim Cullen, has become “a 
banner in which millions of Americans can rally, a point of reference” that can be recreated 
and participated in like a “form of communion” that is best served from a Southern 
perspective.
57 
  
And while there are examples of popular culture that have derided Gone with the 
Wind’s interpretation of the Old South and the war (see Alex Haley’s 1976 publication 
Roots: The Saga of an American Family, the subsequent T.V. miniseries of the same name, 
and the 1989 Civil War epic Glory), the Lost Cause has remained vigilant in Southern 
memory.
58
 In fact, one might argue as historians Gaines Foster and Alan Nolan, that “[t]he 
                                                          
56. For interpretations of President Grant in film see Griffith and Dixon, The Birth of a Nation; D.W. Griffith et 
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Video, 2000) [orig. rel. 1989]; Herman Gray, Watching Race: Television and the Struggle for Blackness 
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Lost Cause represents the national memory of the Civil War, [and has] been substituted for 
the [official] history of the war.”
59
 Perhaps Rhett Butler said it best when Scarlett pleads for 
him not to join the Confederate army after the fall of Atlanta, a defining point of Gone with 
the Wind. He replies, “Maybe [I join] because I have a weakness for lost causes once they’re 
really lost.”
60
 Perhaps so too does the United States.  For it is surely true, that during the 
twentieth century’s Civil Rights Movement and via popular Southern Civil War 
reenactments, Americans used the Lost Cause to recollect a mythic version of the Old South 
and slavery that perpetuated the ideas behind the horrific social hierarchies that existed in the 
days before the Civil War. 
But how unique was the South’s response? As has been noted, post-war Germany 
remains its most appropriate comparison despite the vast differences between cultures, 
nations, and circumstances. But the fact is, both responded politically (though under very 
different circumstances), artistically, and socially in ways that overtly portrayed themselves 
in the best light possible with romantic interpretations of dark histories and human atrocities. 
Thus both can be compared on the grounds that they maintained pride in their regions and 
cultures by either omitting, or remembering fondly, the ways in which they had previously 
lived and the wars that were brought on them by an outside force. These comparisons can be 
seen on both the landscape as well as in books, movies, and political statements and will be 
referred to accordingly. Both societies’ historical memories, taken conjunctively, can reveal 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
provide the most notable popular culture derisions of the Lost Cause. Neither piece portrays the Old South or 
the institutional slavery as positive, and instead represents the most pervasive attempts to provide a Northern or 
African American perspective in modern years. The impact of these movies becomes especially clear when 
considering the amount of acclaim they received: Roots alone boasted around 140 million viewers, nine Emmy 
Awards, and one Golden Globe, and still ranks in the 100 most watched television shows of all-time; whereas, 
Glory racked up twelve awards (three of which were Oscars).  
 
59. Foster, Ghosts of the Confederacy, 89; Gallagher and Nolan, The Myth of the Lost Cause, 13. 
 
60. Howard and Fleming, Gone with the Wind, DVD. 
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desperately important lessons for Germany, the United States, and the world as modern 
countries seek to move progressively into the twenty-first century and reconcile the notorious 
events in human history.   
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HISTORICAL MEMORY OF WORLD WAR II AND THE NAZIS IN GERMAN 
SOCIETY AND LANDSCAPE 
“My biography politicized me, forcibly, sometimes almost against my will.” These 
are the words of Heinrich Bӧll, one of Germany’s most widely read authors and Nobel Prize 
winner. Born in December of 1917, Bӧll claimed that his earliest memory was watching, 
from his mother’s arms, defeated German soldiers return to their homes in Cologne at the end 
of World War I. And after the war’s resolution, he watched Germany’s democratic Weimar 
Republic eventually succumb to Adolph Hitler and the National Socialist party (Nazi party) 
following political and economic instability within the Republic and an anti-democratic 
process that never saw Hitler win the popular vote.
1
 Unlike the Weimar Republic, the Nazi 
era focused heavily on national unity and the needs of a strong dictatorship as it sought to 
navigate the onset of the worldwide Great Depression and Germany’s immense debt ordered 
by the Treaty of Versailles’ reparation clauses to the Allies. War, defeat, hyperinflation of the 
German Mark, a brief respite during the Goldene Zwanziger (Golden Twenties) when the 
German economy grew, and the economic crisis during the 1930s were the conditions under 
which Bӧll grew up—and they influenced him heavily. He understood well the national 
embarrassment that losing a war could engender and, through observation of the Weimar 
Republic, the need for a strong commitment to democracy at an early age. As a result of his 
                                                          
1. Hitler’s anti-democratic ascendance as Chancellor is complicated however. He never staged a coup, but 
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life experiences and insightfulness molded by his deeply religious parents, Bӧll opted for a 
different path than most of his peers by despising Nazism and refusing to join the Hitler 
Youth during the 1930s. But this reality was quickly shattered when he was conscripted into 
the Wehrmacht (German armed forces) in late 1939 where he served dutifully—while being 
wounded four times—in France, Romania, Hungary, and the Soviet Union until his capture 
by American forces in 1945.
2
   
 Like virtually all German men of his generation, Heinrich Bӧll was forced to fight for 
the Nazi cause. But his life after being released from an Allied prisoner of war camp was far 
from the norm. He picked up writing at a time when the German language was under intense 
scrutiny due to the connotations stirred up by common words such as Vaterland (fatherland), 
loyalitӓt (loyalty), lager (camp), and gas; and produced a litany of stories that engaged the 
catastrophe of World War II and captured the emotions and motivations of common German 
soldiers. But unlike most German writers of the mid-twentieth century who overlooked the 
ordinary German’s dealings with the Nazis, Heinrich Bӧll was more in tune with Southern 
authors of the late nineteenth century that directly aligned their characters with their recent 
history. However, even though Bӧll did not separate all of his main characters from the 
Nazis, he did not romanticize them either: instead he used them as an outlet to hold himself 
and all of his fellow countrymen accountable for the depredations against humanity in which 
they took part.
3
 In fact, memory is a common theme that saturates Bӧll’s entire body of work 
                                                          
2. Robert C. Conard, Understanding Heinrich Bӧll (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1992), 1-3, 
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3. In Heinrich Bӧll’s novel A Soldier’s Legacy, trans. Leila Vennewitz (Evanston: Northwestern University 
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(either by the protagonist’s firm grasp of it or the antagonist’s lack thereof) and can be seen 
in one of the most poignant moments in A Soldier’s Legacy: “[U]nderstand that we are not 
born to forget…We are born to remember. To remember rather than forget is our job.”
4
        
 Bӧll’s novels (A Soldier’s Legacy, Billiards at Half-past Nine, and The Unguarded 
House) indicate that he, even during the late 1940s, fought the predominant tendency to 
forget Hitler and the Nazis. Instead, his war novels juxtaposed “good” Germans (those who 
were forced to fight in the war to evade capture by the Allies yet maintained “decency” and 
despised the Nazis) with “bad” Germans (opportunistic soldiers who used ambition, 
ruthlessness, and murder to further their personal glory and the Nazi cause) and placed the 
evils committed by both the Nazi regime and all ordinary Germans at the forefront of his 
writing.
5
 As a result, he has received as much criticism as acclaim, and Bӧll’s work can now 
be read as an early corrective to the Bitburg sentiment that has maintained some popularity 
since the 1980s. The idea behind the Bitburg sentiment is mostly propagated by German 
conservatives and revisionist historians that focus solely on future achievements while 
overlooking past wrongs, namely the Holocaust, based on the notion that most people of the 
Nazi generation are dead and most current Germans were born after war. Bӧll’s writing 
conversely argues, contends German literary historian Robert Conard, “that a nation, like an 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
like most of Bӧll’s heroes, still contain a sense of decency that many lost during the war. This is Bӧll’s political 
message to the German public: that the same opportunistic people who ruthlessly used violence and murder in 
WWII to ascend to higher ranks in the military will be the same people who will go largely unpunished and 
become lawyers, doctors, and politicians in the post-war era.    
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individual, cannot live a healthy, productive life without a full memory intact. A selective 
memory is the disease of national amnesia.
6
   
 Heinrich Bӧll’s confrontation with the role that average Germans, even those who 
loathed the Nazis, played in the tragedies of the Holocaust and World War II is most 
certainly not the norm in popular German memory during the mid-twentieth century. But it is 
indicative of the lesser side of a powerful dichotomy that was created in the German psyche 
after the war. According to historian Tony Judt, the side directly opposite Bӧll consisted of 
an “act of voluntary amnesia” that was necessary in both East and West Germany as Allied 
occupiers thrust, hypercritically, all blame for the death and destruction of World War II on 
the German people.
7
 Each German citizen, therefore, had to either forget everything they 
previously knew about themselves, their friends and neighbors, their nation; or they had to 
risk criticism and painful, emotional memories. The Stunde Null (Zero Hour), or the idea to 
start German society anew following the war, became a reasonable mission.
8
 But as Germany 
was occupied by Allied nations who also too conveniently ignored their own dealings with 
Hitler’s regime, the decision to “forget” became easy—and perhaps subconscious on some 
level—as Germans sought to progress and move into the future under Allied governance and 
the idealistic Stunde Null.   
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As each European country involved in World War II was then forced, in one way or 
another, to confront their positions in Nazi-era history, German remembrance became 
interestingly contingent on the positions chosen by other nations.  European memory of the 
war became “that of things done to ‘us’ by Germans” during the war, or the “recollection of 
things done by ‘us’ to [the Germans] after the war.”
9
 Therefore, Germans were largely 
identified as the absolute wrong-doer, especially after the pan-European expulsion of the 
Volksdeutsche (German people) back to Germany by accord of the 1945 Potsdam Agreement 
and the immediate advance of the Nuremburg Trials.
10
 After all, if it were not for Nazi 
militarism and Hitler’s Final Solution there would have never been a war and no need for 
European cooperation with them. Total blame for the murders that took place in France, 
Belarus, Latvia, or any other European country for that matter, then rested on German 
shoulders—or at least was justified by their occupation throughout Europe—and absolved all 
other Nazi collaborators of their guilt.
11
 The Germans were guilty; everyone else innocent: a 
memory that the Germans, too, used to build a sense of Nazi victimization that allowed them 
to exclude “regular Germans” from the events of their recent past. 
Like in the American South, Germany’s loss in World War II caused a sense of 
embarrassment that engendered victimization throughout their society. Instead of the South 
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overthrowing the United States Constitution and seceding from the Union, Hitler and the 
Nazi party superseded the Weimar Republic and started a war in which ordinary citizens 
were forced to take part to protect their homeland from outside invaders. But unlike the 
American South, Germans did not immediately resist the ideologies of their occupiers and 
instead chose to accept their presence and forget their recent past in lieu of glorifying it. The 
result was a myriad of cultural, historical, and political exposés that whitewashed German 
history, absolved ordinary citizens and soldiers of guilt, and hand-picked the events in which 
national pride should be felt. Not until years later, as was the case in the American South 
following the Civil War, was the romanticized German experience of World War II 
challenged by a new generation that believed the horrors of the Holocaust must be 
confronted.         
Origins of Victimization: 
 Following World War II, the International Military Tribunal sought to prosecute the 
highest ranking political, military, and economic officials of Nazi Germany at Nuremburg in 
1946. The tribunal intended to punish the leadership that significantly took part in furthering 
the National Socialist agenda through death or imprisonment. However, clear distinctions 
had to made about who committed such crimes and a hierarchy developed that punished 
those most closely linked. So, were common soldiers, the Wehrmacht high command, and the 
Schutzstaffel (the SS, or, by direct translation, the German “defense corps”) equal in guilt, or 
did individuals with central roles in the Nazi regime make them more deserving of a harsher 
punishment? To provide some structure, and provide an answer to those difficult questions, 
the tribunal declared in 1946 that the Gestapo, SS, and Sicherheitsdienst (the SS’s 
“intelligence agency”; SD by abbreviation) to be inherently criminal organizations of the 
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Nazi party and guilty of “crimes against humanity” while absolving the Wehrmacht of such 
central responsibility. The official ruling on the Wehrmacht, along with the Allied Armies, 
was that they had merely committed “war crimes.” The Tribunal’s ruling is further muddied 
by the fact that it only managed to put twenty-one top Nazis on trial before it concluded.
12
 
 The implications of such a ruling, and lack of punishment, set an incredible precedent 
vís-a-vís German guilt: participation in German depredations was minimized and those that 
were committed were the actions of a select few that were central to Nazi organizations. Any 
excesses committed by the Nazi hierarchy or German army were merely the byproducts of 
war, national loyalty, and no different from Allied war crimes—a contention that is directly 
counter to Jürgen Fӧrster’s analysis of the required reading pamphlets issued to the German 
army before the invasion of Poland in 1939. According to Fӧrster, the titles of the 
pamphlets—“The Officer and Politics,” “The Army in the Third Reich,” and “The Battle for 
German Living Space” to name a few—allude to their content and the central role that the 
Wehrmacht was to play in Hitler’s Final Solution.
13
 But the actions taken by the German 
Army on occasions such as the 1940 Vinkt Massacre in Belgium, the August 1941 Byelaya 
Tserkov massacre in the Ukraine, and the routine selection of Jewish prisoners in Poland 
suggest that the Wehrmacht must have digested the anti-Semitic and anti-partisan themes of 
the propaganda pamphlets more completely than most German citizens cared to remember 
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following the war.
14 
One former member of the SS, August Hafner, remembered the 
horrendous actions of the Wehrmacht at Byelaya Tserkov vividly: 
…Then Blobel [Haffner’s superior officer] ordered me to have the children 
executed…The children were taken down from the tractor. They were lined up 
along the top of the grave and shot so that they fell into it. The wailing was 
indescribable. I shall never forget the scene throughout my life… I 
particularly remember a small fair-haired girl who took me by the hand. She 
too was shot later…Many children were hit four or five times before they 
died.
15
 
But candid accounts such as the one above were not the norm after 1945 as Wehrmacht 
veterans viewed themselves as separate from the Nazi regime. In their memoirs, veterans 
claimed to have fought a “clean war” in the name of noble Prussian-German traditions, 
patriotism, honor and duty. National Socialism, they contended, had little influence on the 
army.
16 
Even claims of military gallantry became typical in post-war Germany, though this 
celebration was not quite to the levels of Confederate Civil War veterans. For example, the 
commander of the Wehrmacht’s 12
th
 Infantry Division commented that his division’s “name, 
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its coat of arms and its weapons remained unsullied till the very last day as even the enemy 
conceded.”
17
 In other words, all battles fought by the 12
th
 Infantry Division were always 
conducted fairly and morally—though gruesome and hard fought—under the rules of war.
18 
But perhaps a more telling source is Walter Gӧrlitz’s 1961 biography about German Field 
Marshall Wilhelm Keitel, titled Felddmarshal Wilhelm Keitel: Verbrecher oder Offizier?, 
that was edited out of Keitel’s memoirs. Translated, the title reads Field Marshall Wilhelm 
Keitel: Criminal or Officer?—a phrase that, by the question it poses in the subtitle, suggests 
Wehrmacht officers and Nazi war criminals were conflicting entities and Keitel’s execution 
during the Nuremburg trials unwarranted. Keitel’s fulfillment of the Führer’s orders, argued 
Gӧrlitz, were “necessary” acts of loyalty, patriotism, and self-preservation.
19
 But despite 
former Wehrmacht apologias that romanticize, and even valorize, their war exploits, most 
German historians and political actors became more interested in seeing themselves, rather 
than others, as Nazi victims (reminiscent of how Southern politicians and intellectuals 
claimed to be victims of the North)—especially after the onset of the Cold War replaced the 
need to prosecute war crimes with an urgency to remilitarize during the 1950s. 
 In both postwar Germany and the American South, subsequent wars helped both 
societies move forward from their recent pasts by bringing current issues of internal 
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importance to the forefront of their national conscience. However, rearmament was a serious 
hot-button issue in both East and West Germany during the Cold War due to the militaristic 
hangover that was still present after World War II. Questions regarding Nazi terror and the 
trust issues surrounding those formerly connected to World War II merited confrontation by 
both the German and Allied populace. As tensions increased between Western nations and 
the Soviet Union, both sides realized that a standing military was necessary and that formerly 
trained soldiers would have to be utilized. As a result, historical memory of the war was 
invoked in such a way to justify the Wehrmacht’s actions during the war. For example, 
Soviet attacks on German civilians during the final years of the war garnered more historical 
attention in the years immediately following the war than did the vastly under-mentioned 
subject of German atrocities against Soviet civilians in the years between 1941 and 1944. 
However, this claim was not just popular while Nazi propaganda circulated and after defeat 
at the hands of the Red Army was freshly imprinted on German psyches. Operation 
Barbarossa (the codename of Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union) continued to be 
portrayed by West German historians as a necessary “preventative measure” taken by 
Germany in response to an alleged Soviet attack planned in July 1941, well into the 1950s—a 
sentiment similar to the South’s assertion that the Civil War was fought as a defense against 
Northern aggression that the threatened the Constitution and the Southern way of life.
20 
  
Though there is no direct comparison to the way that the South justified the treatment 
of slaves, the recollection that the Nazis were solely responsible for the extermination of six 
million Jews did lead many Germans to absolve themselves of guilt over the violence the 
Wehrmacht inflicted on Soviet civilians and prisoners of war. Instead Soviet aggression and 
                                                          
20. Jürgen Fӧrster, “The Wehrmacht and the War of Extermination Against the Soviet Union,” in Michael 
Marrus, The “Final Solution": The Implementation of Mass Murder, Vol. 2 (Westpoint: Meckler Press, 1989), 
493. 
48 
 
subordinate victimization completely belittled the fact that the German military loyally 
fought alongside the Nazis for European conquest.
21
 Again, unlike in the postwar American 
South where Wade Hampton and Southern Democrats relied on political aggression to 
solidify notions of racial inferiority and Southern pride, the belief that ordinary Germans 
could not be Nazis was furthered by a much more subtle, and highly controversial, political 
statement in 1985 at Bitburg. The events of the Bitburg controversy center on a visit planned 
by United States President Ronald Reagan and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl who, 
since his taking office in 1982, attempted to restore the reputations of as many Germans who 
had served the Third Reich as possible by downplaying German guilt. In one of Kohl’s more 
notable efforts, he removed Waffen-SS veteran organizations from a parliamentary list of 
right-wing extremist groups and repeatedly blocked the efforts of Social Democrats to ban 
their reunions.
22
 But Reagan’s visit was more than an effort to instill national pride by Kohl; 
it was meant to rehabilitate history by displaying the positive relationship that existed 
between one-time enemies. The only problems: Reagan and Kohl originally did not plan to 
visit a concentration camp and were instead only going to visit the Kolmeshӧhe cemetery 
where forty-nine members of the Waffen-SS were buried. A stop at a concentration camp 
was unnecessary because there were very few living veterans and such an occurrence would 
impose a sense of guilt on those that are too young to remember the war, claimed the two 
leaders.
23 
Understandably, this caused outrage from the American and German Jewish 
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communities and prominent public figures and intellectuals such as Elie Wiesel, Rabbi 
Alexander M. Schindler, and Menachem Z. Rosensaft all responded (comparable to the 
outrage of counter-memories by black leaders in the NAACP and W.E.B. Dubois at the turn 
of the twentieth century in the American South). “Equating Nazi soldiers with Holocaust 
Victims,” wrote Schindler, “is a distortion of history, a perversion of language, and a callous 
offense for the Jewish people.”
24
 But President Reagan stood behind his prior statement that 
prompted Schindler’s response: 
[The SS troops] were the villains that conducted the persecutions…[T]here are 
2,000 graves there, and most of those, the average age is eighteen. I think that 
there’s nothing wrong with visiting that cemetery where those young men are 
victims of Nazism also, even though they were fighting in the German 
uniform, drafted into service to carry out the hateful wishes of the Nazis. They 
were victims, just as surely as the victims of the victims in the concentration 
camps.
25
             
 The visit to Bitburg took place on May 5, 1985, as Chancellor Kohl urged the 
President to continue and his words garnered support from a majority of West German 
citizens, though a stop at the nearby Bergen-Belsen concentration camp was added to the 
itinerary. Crowds and cameras gathered as Reagan and Kohl spoke about the necessity of 
Holocaust remembrance while standing beside the mass-graves of Bergen-Belsen and then 
when they took part in a wreath-laying in memory of German soldiers killed during World 
War II at the Kolmeshӧhe cemetery. The importance of these two events at Bitburg is 
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imperative to the study of German memory in the postwar era. According to Jürgen 
Habermas, the juxtaposition of the wreath laying on the Nazi graves and the speeches at the 
mass graves of Bergen-Belsen took away from the singularity of the Nazi crimes, especially 
after the handshakes of veteran Wehrmacht generals in the presence of President Reagan. At 
this point many realized what Habermas and the Bitburg sentiment both proclaim: that the 
Germans “had always been on the right side of the struggle” against a Bolshevist enemy and 
that not every German soldier needed to be equated with the Nazis.
26
        
Given the popular sentiment emanating from the 1985 events in Bitburg, there is little 
surprise that the German Historikerstreit (Historian’s Dispute)—that attempts to remove the 
obstacle of Nazism from German identity by placing them within a larger pan-European 
model of comparable state crimes—developed at about the same time.
27
 Unlike the 
historiographical literature that made Nazism appear as the exception rather than the norm in 
the 1950-60s, the Historikerstreit of the late 1980s has been called an apologist movement 
that seeks to white-wash German history in much the same way that Lost Causers have been 
criticized for rewriting history to insist that slavery was not the reason for the Civil War. For 
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instance, in the late 1980s and 1990s, historians Richard J. Evans argued that despite the 
historical fact of the German military’s “extreme brutality and barbarism” in the war against 
the Soviet Union, subsequent revisionist historians in the 1980s misconstrued the Wehrmacht 
as a force for the good.
28
 Omer Bartov continues: 
...the bizarre inversion of the Wehrmacht's roles proposed by [the] exponents 
of the new revisionism, whereby overtly or by implication the Army is 
transformed from culprit to saviour, from an object of hatred and fear to one 
of empathy and pity, from victimizer to victim.
29
 
 
Evans further argued that the Wehrmacht was being falsely represented in academic memory 
contending that many German officers told their soldiers that the invasion of Poland in 1939 
was provoked by “Jewish vermin” and regarded the Russians as a “Jewish Bolshevic” group 
of “sub-humans.” According to Evans, there is substantial evidence that a significant number 
of German soldiers actively believed and supported the conflict against the Soviet Union as a 
means to cleanse Europe of the “Asiatic flood” of “Mongol Hordes” and the “red beast” 
along the way, but that fact was quickly forgotten in post-World War II Germany.
30
 
Revisionist historian Ernst Nolte—who still defended many of the actions of the Wehrmacht 
as rational, though extreme, “preventative measures”—was among the most significant and 
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controversial, as most historians from West Germany, and virtually all abroad, condemned 
his interpretation of the Holocaust, which created the Historikerstreit, as justification.
31
    
In the end, the Historikerstreit remains an important insight into German memory of 
World War II and the Nazis. It garnered heavy media attention in West Germany and was 
widely read and its central question—whether the Nazis were an unequal evil in history or 
merely an extreme example of a larger European trend—was considered by younger 
generations both inside and outside of Germany. The importance of the Historikerstreit, 
however, is the national recognition of two trends—feelings of empathy toward the German 
military and an insistence that the genocide enacted by the Nazis was comparable to the 
crimes of other European nations—that leftist critics such as Israeli historian Omer Bartov 
say reflect the broader unwillingness of many Germans to admit what their military, 
government, and citizens did during the war.
32
 The fact remains that the Wehrmacht did play 
a key role in Nazi history and thus merited being reevaluated despite the insistence of self-
serving, former soldiers and generals who framed it as a highly professional, apolitical force 
that was a victim of a harsh ideology.
33
 It is no secret that contentions such as Michael 
Stürmer’s—that the German people and the Nazis were on a logical “right side” of a 
Bolshevist enemy from the east and that collective memory of Nazi crimes in Germany 
needed to be wiped clean and reevaluated in terms of a rational response to a Soviet threat—
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are historically, culturally, and socially flawed.
34
 The ramifications of ignoring the racial and 
ethnocentric motivations behind National Socialism and justifying the defense against of 
“Judeo-Bolshevism” should be clear: anti-Semitism was still a problem in the decades after 
the war as it was before, only this time relegated to the back of German minds.   
The controversial Historikerstreit of the late 1980s, however, lost steam as younger 
generations came of age in the nineties and many of the Nazi generation had died off.  Like 
in the mid-twentieth century American South, the German public eventually did reevaluate, 
and on some level came to terms with their ancestors’ troubled past. But as the overwhelming 
public outcry surrounding Ernst Nolte’s reception of the Konrad Adenauer Literary Prize and 
subsequent speeches about the “rational core” of Nazism prove, even in the year 2000 a 
conservative core still existed—immersed in the sentiment of Nazi victimization of regular 
Germans and the legitimate threat of “Judeo-Bolshevism”—that still actively opposed the 
open-minded, critical analysis of Nazi Germany conducted by leftist German historians and 
public thinkers.
35 
         
Memorialization and Popular Culture in Post-Nazi Germany: 
As the German public felt the burden of their recent Nazi history weigh heavily on 
their shoulders in the post-World War II era, a generation of forgetfulness and victimization 
took shape behind German guilt. This is measurable in many aspects of German society. For 
instance, as noted by historian Tony Judt, during the decades following the war “the teaching 
of modern history in West Germany did not pass beyond Bismarck [1890]” (a stark contrast 
to Southern textbooks that not only covered the Civil War and slavery, but justified and 
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romanticized them).
36
 Instead, most time was spent looking either before or beyond the Nazi 
era, and if National Socialism was explained at all, it only took place through a 
fundamentally nationalistic, conservative lens that depicted the Third Reich as a mere moral 
deviation from normal German high society.
37
 But victimization and German forgetfulness 
can perhaps be best examined in attempts at memorialization and popular culture. The 
debates surrounding how fallen soldiers and Nazi bureaucratic organizations needed to be 
represented in memory permeated both East and West Germany following the war. On one 
hand, many thought their dead relatives and friends merited remembrance. But on the other, 
the genocide, rape, and imperial aspirations of the Nazi regime—as well as the roles that 
everyday Germans played therein—were best left forgotten.      
Unlike in the South, where the end of the Civil War sparked the rise of an entire 
memorialization movement, there was little memorializing of Nazis and World War II in 
immediate post-war Germany. Allied influence and occupation rendered such attempts at 
remembrance relatively silent. However, it would be short-sighted to overlook the attempts 
that were made and say that Germans simply had zero interest in memorialization following 
the war. Historian Rudy Koshar’s lengthy study on “artifacts of German memory” between 
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the years of 1870 and 1990 goes to great lengths to point out such attempts at Nazi 
remembrance. Essentially, Koshar argues that following several years of commercialization 
of national memory—in which the Nazis propagandized existing war memorials, literature, 
and the deaths of soldiers to fit their militaristic agenda and appeal to the German populace 
through a sense of national unity behind previous wars—the conclusion of World War II 
forced Germans to lay the nationalist, “collective allergy” of memory making to rest and 
make decisions about what was going to be reconstructed, destroyed, or built anew.
38
 Similar 
to the South following the Civil War, Koshar contends that the years between 1945 and 1970 
were filled with attempts, though highly contested in both East and West Germany by Allied 
and Jewish outlets, to remember Nazi genocide with small town memorials, cemeteries, and 
renovating destroyed buildings that existed during the pre-war era. For instance, some 
common acts of remembrance were to add the names of fallen Wehrmacht soldiers to pre-
existing monuments—in many cases, these were World War I memorials that previously 
represented German sacrifice and honor during the Nazi years—and to place “memorial 
stones” on the grounds of churches, homes, and historic cites depicting the name of the 
departed, troop identification, and often the iron cross.
39
  
Perhaps the best place to look for early postwar German memorials is in cemeteries, 
another similarity shared between Germany and the South. The Ohlsdorf cemetery in 
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Hamburg, for example, contains a wide variety of remembrance as it juxtaposes the 
“Monument for the Victims of Nazi Persecution” with the memorial, “The Passage Over the 
River Styx,” that was constructed in honor of the victims of Operation Gomorrha (the Allied 
firebombing of the city in 1943). The monuments were constructed only three years apart 
(the former in 1949 and the latter in 1952) although the monument to victims of the Nazis 
grew from a memorial service that took place on the spot in 1945. However, the two 
monuments at Ohlsdorf reveal an interesting dichotomy of victimization in early postwar 
Germany: the dead were the victims of either Nazi depredation or the actions of the Allies.  
Some plaques placed on the edge of a mass grave referred to the Allied bombings as a “terror 
attack” while other victims are symbolized by a crown of thorns.
40
 Germans killed in 
Hamburg during World War II, as well as those killed in the rest of Germany, were then 
either remembered as victims or martyrs. Thus, according to Koshar, the construction of 
memory around Nazi tragedies was difficult and incomplete, not completely absent or 
popular.   
While Koshar’s work is important, and he does show conclusively that there were 
immediate post-war attempts at German nationalist memorialization, a more substantial body 
of scholarship shows just how little Nazi remembrance there was. For instance, Helmut 
Peitsch and Tony Judt concur: while there were numerous German-centric memories in the 
immediate post-war years, concentration camps, the Holocaust, and everything particularly 
concerning Nazi history rapidly became a political and artistic taboo in East and West 
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Germany following the war.
41
 Even the memorials erected by the Allied occupiers became 
more significant than German markers and continue to be among the most recognizable 
within the country. For instance, in Berlin, three memorials were constructed in the city 
districts of Tiergarten, Schӧnholzer Heide, and Treptower Park by the Soviet Union during the 
late 1940s in remembrance of fallen Soviet troops during the 1945 Battle of Berlin.
42
 
Therefore, it is the contrast between the Southern memorialization movement and the lack 
thereof in the early post-war era of Germany that drives home the over-arching influence of 
the generation that tried to forget.   
Certain evidence of this contrast can be seen in the city of Dresden, where 
Kristallnacht (the Night of Broken Glass, November 9, 1938) and the British and American 
fire bombings of 1945 left two of the city’s most vibrant religious landmarks in ruins: 
renowned German architect Gottfried Semper’s Opera House and the Frauenkirche (the 
Lutheran Church of Our Lady). The rebuilding of the structures was either ignored, as was 
the case with the synagogue, or was refused, which, according to Susanne Vees-Gulani, was 
due to the fact that they reminded Dresden residents of “the question of German guilt, the 
rise of National Socialism, and the [destruction] of the war.”
43 
In fact, the late 1980s, under 
the German Democratic Republic (GDR), marked the first time that construction of either 
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building was seriously considered. And even then, they were not completed until the early to 
mid-1990s as debates concerning their troubled past, guilt, and victimization circulated.
44
 As 
a further example of “forgetfulness” in the postwar era, in Potsdam, the GDR attempted to 
legitimize its authority through a selective (and antifascist) reconstruction campaign that 
destroyed most surviving Jewish pre-war sites and bypassed Prussian buildings that were to 
serve as a representation of a “humane” German past, which is similar to East Germany’s 
removal of the iron cross from the Brandenburg Gate’s quadriga (a statue of a horse drawn 
chariot that sits atop the structure) and outlawing of the symbol in 1957 as a “‘fascist’ 
ornament.”
45
 Only recently, however, have the actual persecuted victims of the Nazis come 
to the forefront of World War II and Nazi remembrance.
46
   
One of the most well-known and recent examples of Jewish victimization in German 
historical memory is undoubtedly the Holocaust memorial located in downtown Berlin—the 
4.7 acre brainchild of German talk show host Lea Rosh. Containing 2,711 nameless concrete 
slabs, the memorial was completed in 2004 after sixteen years of debate. The controversy 
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surrounding Rosh’s memorial is similar to that outlined in Natasha Goldman’s article, 
“Marking Absence: Remembrance and Hamburg’s Holocaust Memorials,” and Susanne 
Schönborn’s discussion of Frankfurt am Main’s New Börneplatz memorial. In each case the 
memorials are dedicated to Jewish victims of the Holocaust and were only constructed after 
the 1980s as they were disregarded in the immediate postwar years and became subsequently 
challenged by proponents of the Bitburg Sentiment after a few decades had passed.
47
 
Another reason why Rosh’s memorial engenders so much controversy is because it 
stands mere meters away from the former site of Hitler’s Chancellery and creates a sense of 
uneasiness due to its close relation (both literally and figuratively) to the Nazi perpetrators. 
But as is the problem with such a memorial—unless one is privy to the phantom 
landscapes—remembrance of the perpetrators is completely lost on victim-centric memorials. 
Such was the case with the numerous plaques that began appearing on historic sites 
throughout Berlin in the 1970s that honored victims and resisters while sites like Hitler’s 
Chancellery and the Gӧring’s headquarters remained unmarked. This, however, is not the 
case with exhibits that are geared to cause direct confrontation with Germany’s Nazi past that 
began appearing in the final years of West Berlin.
48
 For instance, the most feared and 
powerful address in Nazi Germany, the old Prinz-Albrecht Strasse, has been transformed into 
the highly contested Topography of Terror exhibit that highlights most powerful Nazi 
organizations that used to be housed on its street. 
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Consisting of the renovated Prussian palace, the State School of Applied Art, the 
Hotel Prinz-Albrecht, and several smaller buildings that served as the headquarters for 
Heinrich Himmler’s and Herman Gӧring’s police organizations, Prinz-Albrecht Strasse 8 was 
the heart of the Nazi bureaucracy. Only the Reich’s Chancellery was comparable in 
importance and decision-making. But Prinz-Albrecht Strasse 8 was mostly destroyed in the 
Soviet siege of Berlin, and the new West Germany government, relatively quickly, 
demolished most of the remaining ruins, changed the name of the street to 
Niederkirchnerstraße (in honor of a communist freedom fighter who died in a concentration 
camp in 1944), and made plans to transform the vacant lot into a helipad and later a new 
highway.
49
 In other words, the generation that tried to forget looked forward and attempted to 
erase the horrific memories of interrogation and violence that once happened on the grounds. 
Only after the planned highway remained on the books for decades did Berlin’s 750
th
 
anniversary Founder’s Day celebration in 1987 provide the first deviation from this norm 
when the Gropius Bau museum proposed archeological digs and exhibitions that forced 
confrontation with the Nazi past of the site. After heated debate over the nature of the exhibit, 
the Topography of Terror gained solid footing in 1995 and became an open-ended, 
interpretive memorial to Nazi perpetrators that presides “indefinitely” over old Prinz-
Albrecht Strasse 8 and continues to repulse and provide many with a reason to forget.
50
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 Perhaps, as has been argued by historians, the most notable (and “paradoxically least 
acknowledged,” as proclaimed by historian Anton Kaes) identifier of historical memory 
outweighs even the impact of public memorials, schools and universities, and novels: 
cinema.
51
 According to historians Bernhard Chiari and Anton Kaes, films are “carriers of 
collective memory” that project a society’s beliefs, values, and interpretations of national 
history onto a screen that “organize[s], and, to a large degree, homogenize[s] public 
memory.”
52
 And in Germany during the post-war era, as in the post-Civil War American 
South, this was no different. There is only one caveat that American films did not have to 
contend with in during the twentieth century however: the Big Three (Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin) had separated Germany at the Yalta conference when 
determining the new national boundaries and type of government that the defeated nation 
would have. It was decided that West Germany would follow the Capitalist Republic model 
more in line with western ideologies while East Germany would become a Marxist-Leninist 
socialist state under the guidance of the Soviet Union. Therefore, a type of “collective 
amnesia” set in for twenty-five years in West Germany as they embarked with fellow 
Western European nations on the capitalist “European adventure” that continued to grow 
their economy, the U.S.S.R. driven “domestic revolution”—an action deemed necessary by 
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the Soviets to implement a socialist society that was fueled by an  antifascist, national 
liberation historical imperative—hampered the East German film industry’s ability to address 
their recent past in the movies they produced.
53
 In other words, in order to make sure the East 
German people bought into their Marxist-Leninist ideology, East German films needed to 
declare the fascist Nazis evil, move beyond their era in history, and celebrate the merits of 
socialism. However victimization and collective forgetfulness worked to drown out the 
historical reality of World War II from the German side in both East and West Germany on 
some level. Filmmakers (this tendency was certainly more pronounced in West Germany for 
the reasons stated above) preferred to portray the role of the Wehrmacht in the recent war as 
“palatable and sometimes heroic,” writes Temple University historian Jay Lockenour—thus 
rendering the films widely popular among German audiences.
54
 However, the popularity of 
German war films took time. Lockenour continues: “[i]n a film industry tightly controlled by 
the Allied Military Governments, German cinemas screened virtually no war films for 
several years after 1945. Then [in the mid-1950s], the floodgates opened.”
55
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 After several years of Allied effort to tightly monitor film production and distribution 
in Germany, their regulations became more lax in 1949 as about 600 war films (most of 
which were American) were screened in Germany over a fifteen year period. It was the 
German films, however, that were the most viewed, highest grossing, and generated the most 
heated debate. 
56
 Take for instance the film trilogy 08/15—based on the novel of the same 
name by Hans Helmut Kirst and the most comparable in national popularity to Gone with the 
Wind—that follows a group of Wehrmacht recruits from their training prior to 1939 (part I), 
to the frigid Russian front in 1941-42 (part II), and finally to their hometown for the collapse 
of the Reich in 1945 (part III).
57 
The protagonist of the story is a young German soldier 
named Asch, whose sensitivity and skill on the piano could win the sympathy any viewer, 
who is supplanted from a place of class and high culture and shipped off to the Eastern Front 
with little to no understanding as to why. The genocidal nature of Germany’s war on the 
eastern front goes unmentioned, and the soldiers, too, are framed as victims of an abrupt 
outbreak of war that they did not fully understand.
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The first installment of 08/15 quickly became one of Germany’s most successful 
movies of 1954 and continued to pack theaters with its sequels.
59
 But its popularity was 
based on more than its handsome cast: it depicted the common Wehrmacht soldier and his 
everyday life in a way that was uniformly accepted as accurate. Quite the contrary was true 
however. According to Omer Bartov’s article “Celluloid Soldiers,” a real-life Lieutenant 
Asch would have undoubtedly comprehended what he was fighting for given the intense anti-
Judeo-Bolshevist indoctrination within the Wehrmacht. Bartov argues that German films of 
the 1950s never portrayed the pervasiveness of National Socialism within the German 
military or the utterly ruthless brutality used by the Wehrmacht at the end of the war. Even 
though many German veterans denied such hatred, the reality of the massive death toll on the 
eastern front makes clear that they bought into Nazi propaganda and showed a deep 
commitment to National Socialism.
60
 But instead, Asch (whose charm, wit, cunning, and 
loyalty are comparable to Rhett Butler’s in Gone with the Wind) and the rest of his unit are 
overtly portrayed as the naïve victims of war. Only the Nazis—the antithesis of regular 
German high society and morality—and the occasional officer in charge of relegating basic 
necessities to Wehrmacht soldiers were portrayed negatively.
61
 The Nazi caricatures in 08/15 
were the true victimizers of Europe and German innocence.   
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Other German movies of the 1950s also ostensibly display the Wehrmacht as a victim 
of Nazism. In the 1958 film Der Arzt von Stalingrad (The Doctor from Stalingrad), the 
German prisoners of war that the movie focuses on are portrayed as more civilized, of sound 
morality, and of higher intelligence than their Soviet captors, who, for the most part, appear 
as a degenerate horde that berate and torture German prisoners—much like the Northern and 
African American savages depicted in The Birth of a Nation and Gone with the Wind. To no 
surprise, a recurring theme in Der Arzt von Stalingrad is that the German soldiers were 
punished for Nazi crimes that they had no part in committing.
62
 The 1959 film Hunde, wolt 
ihr ewig leben? (Dogs, do you want to live forever?), which follows with the Battle of 
Stalingrad, also contains no mention of National Socialist ideology, the Holocaust, or the 
German militarism that prompted the war as it hails the heroism of its protagonists in the face 
of battle.
63
 Even during the 1990s, the movie Stalingrad still used the heroic victim 
framework by depicting German soldiers’ noble, yet futile effort, at Stalingrad. The 
reconstruction of the defeat of the German 6
th
 Army is itself victimizing, but the militaristic 
German political context that got the army in Russia in the first place is not once mentioned 
during the film. (Though, in this movie one Wehrmacht officer is depicted as evil for 
assaulting a female Russian captive.) However, the attack is suddenly thwarted by a gallant 
young Wehrmacht lieutenant who is disgusted by the actions of his commander and promptly 
kills him).
64
 For the German war film industry, as was also the case in the United States, once 
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a popular sentiment was established, deviation became increasingly harder for writers, 
producers, and directors.
65
 
The 1950s also saw a number of films based on German resistance to the Nazis. In 
Des Teufels General (The Devil's General) of 1954, a general in the German Air Force 
named Harras, who at first appears to be a rash, womanizing, alcoholic, untrustworthy 
buffoon, turns out to be a noble officer who intentionally designs defective airplanes in order 
to sabotage the German war effort. General Harras, persuaded to take such action by his aide, 
Oderbruch, ultimately represents a German patriot and martyr worthy of the highest praise 
and admiration, but only after he comes to see World War II for what it truly is: unnecessary, 
foolish, and amoral. In the end, officer Harras commits suicide as atonement for his 
participation in the war of abominations, which the movie never addresses, by crashing a 
plane into a Nazi fuel reserve.
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Only one year later, two films took a more direct route at showing German resistance.  
Es Geschah am 20. Juli (It Happened on the 20
th
 of July) and Der 20. Juli (The 20
th
 of July), 
released almost simultaneously, addressed the attempted assassination attempts on Hitler by 
Col. Claus von Stauffenberg in 1944. According to Lockenour and Klaus Sigl, neither movie 
was a box office success, but they, like Des Teufels General, placed German conspirators “on 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
64. The argument and gallant Wehrmacht soldier scene is also seen in Bartov, “Celluloid Soldiers,” 138-139. 
 
65. Zibaso, Kansalik and Radványi,  Der Arzt von Stalingrad, DVD; Wisbar et al., Stalingrad: Hunde, Wollt Ihr 
Ewig Leben?, DVD; Jürgen Büscher, Johannes Heide, and Joseph Vilsmaier, Stalingrad, DVD (Helsinki: 
Scanbox Entertainment, 2003) [orig. rel. 1993]. 
66. Helmut Kӓutner et al., Des Teufels General, DVD (Arthaus Filmverleih, 1999) [orig. rel. 1955]. Harras’ 
character is loosely based on the real life General Udet. And like Harras, Udet did design faulty planes, but not 
intentionally. Udet did not necessarily hate Nazism either, he was just an incompetent mechanic and engineer. 
Similar arguments also found in Lockenour, “Black and White Memories of War,” 171-172; Bartov, “Celluloid 
Soldiers,” 132-133. 
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a national pedestal” and Der 20. Juli received an award for the “film that contributes most to 
promoting the democratic ideal.”
67
 They also successfully depicted the German officer corps 
as fundamentally noble and honorable men who were under the control of an evil Reich 
unrepresentative of normal German society. For instance, in an early scene in Der 20. Juli the 
conspirators conclude to kill Hitler immediately following the statement that “[Jews] are 
humans as we are… [There is no] understanding this racial hatred.”
68
 The conspirators speak 
in such a manner that it appears they are speaking for all of the Wehrmacht and all of 
Germany—isolating themselves from the Nazis. Officers such as Harras and Stauffenberg 
served a criminal Nazi regime on screen, but the writing of Des Teufels General, Es Geschah 
am 20. Juli, and Der 20. Juli include a litany of exculpatory statements that suggest German 
soldiers were never corrupted by or conformed to the Nazis that overthrew their government 
in 1933.  
Certainly there are other themes in these West German war films that illuminate how 
World War II was remembered in Germany during the 1950s. In Hunde, Wollt ihr ewig 
leben? (Dogs, Do You Want to Live Forever?), the narrative is yet another example of a 
heroic, valiant German holding out against overwhelming odds at Stalingrad—a scene akin 
to the Confederate troops holding out against Sherman at the Battle of Atlanta in Gone with 
the Wind.
69
 But perhaps the best parallel between German and American films in the context 
                                                          
67. Klaus Sigl, Werner Schneider and Ingo Tornow, Jede Menge Kohle? Kunst und Kommerz auf dem 
deutschen fimmarkt der Nachkreigzeit (Munich: Fimland Presse, 1986), 22; quoted in Lockenour, “Black and 
White Memories of War,” 171. 
 
68. Falk Harnack, Werner Jӧrg Lüddecke and Günther Weisenborg, Der 20. Juli, DVD (Munich: Central 
Cinema Company, 1998) [orig. rel. 1955]. 
 
69. Wisbar et al., Stalingrad: Hunde, Wollt Ihr Ewig Leben?, DVD. In “Celluloid Soldiers,” Omer Bartov 
argues that the 6th Army’s last stand at Stalingrad was a favorite depiction of German heroism for filmmakers 
in mid-twentieth century Germany; however, no movie has so far showed the 6th Army’s overt cooperation 
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of the Civil War and World War II is the 1993 movie Stalingrad that shows Soviet tanks 
literally burying German soldiers in foxholes. Like in American movies about the Civil War 
that depict the Union’s vast resources and superior numbers as the only reason the North was 
victorious, a common German perception is that the Soviet Union defeated them in the same 
manner. Only under the immense weight of Soviet tanks could the superiorly trained, more 
cunning German soldier be defeated.
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Furthermore, German soldiers were not only depicted as better soldiers, they were 
also more masculine than their enemies, as Heide Fehrenbach’s Cinema in Democratizing 
Germany and Omer Bartov’s “Celluloid Soldiers” reveal. As noted by Bartov, these films 
portray the average German soldier in the East as an admirable hero. This then led to the 
tendency to remove the political context of World War II, and polarize the struggle. In other 
words, the few German soldiers depicted in the movie, that audiences were expected to favor, 
fought an immense army of vicious, nameless Russian soldiers that never appeared to run out 
of men. In such a plot line, war criminals had no place within the Wehrmacht—an army 
made up of predominantly manly war heroes that could seduce the most exotic and beautiful 
women—just as they had no place in the Confederate army of Hollywood’s American 
South.
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with the Einsatzgruppen’s (Nazi paramilitary “Operational Forces” under the SD, or more commonly referred 
to as “Death Squads”) mass murder of Soviet Jews in the 1941 march across Ukraine. Furthermore, Bartov 
posits that German films dwelled on the suffering of the 6th Army at the Battle of Stalingrad, and its wake, 
without even slightly suggesting that the Germans were responsible for the invasion the Soviet Union. The 
Russians, not the Wehrmacht, were actually the ones fighting in defense of their homeland.   
 
70. Büscher, Heide and Vilsmaier, Stalingrad, DVD; Lockenour, “Black and White Memories of War,” 169. 
 
71. Fehrenbach, Cinema in Democratizing Germany, 95-105; Bartov, “Celluloid Soldiers,” 135-139. 
Masculinity also appeared in both German movies about the Wehrmacht and American movies about the South 
as a response to an identity crisis stemming from their defeat. In both cases, damsels of beauty such as Scarlett 
O’Hara and exotic temptresses from the eastern front of World War II were conquests of Confederates and 
Germans. A clear hierarchy of paternal order that stressed strength, vitality, and manliness was reestablished in 
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Aside from representing the German soldiers as strapping young heroes and the 
Soviets as savages, 08/15’s closing moments reveal a much more critical stereotype, one that 
should have always been at center stage when discussing Germany’s role in World War II. 
As Germany is being occupied, American soldiers are portrayed as moronic and utterly 
inferior in every way to the heroic, overly masculine German soldiers. There is, however, one 
exception. The intelligent, unscrupulous Jewish-American officer who, as Bartov notes, 
implies World War II’s greatest tragedy as espoused by the film: that the Jews were not 
exterminated and instead had returned upon Germany’s defeat to again exploit the 
Volksdeutsche.
72
 This becomes especially clear when the Jewish officer speaks German with 
an upper-class accent, plainly suggesting that he fled his upper-class, Jewish roots to the 
United States after the ascension of Hitler and the Nazis.
73
 Returning after 1945 to engage in 
black market dealing the Jewish character conveyed only one message: that the moral, 
economic, and racial reasons behind Hitler’s Final Solution still remained in the wake of 
Germany’s defeat.
74
 This is a stark contrast to the actual historical events that took place in 
the South, but yet is eerily similar to the ideas linked to them and that are most evidently 
depicted in The Birth of a Nation and its novelization: that a race of people could prove 
detrimental to a higher society that must keep such inferiors (freed African Americans and 
Jews) systematically in check. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the years following the wars (though definitions of American and German masculinity differed based on 
dynamic systems of values).    
72. Bartov, “Celluloid Soldiers,” 136. The return of the conniving Jewish soldier in 08/15 brings forth another 
parallel between cinematic memory of the Civil War in the South and World War II in Germany. The Birth of a 
Nation uses the emancipation of slaves and the presence of Northern blacks to show that their black race almost 
destroyed Southern society. Their freedom was a tragedy just as the return of the Jewish race was in Germany.  
 
73. Ibid.; May et al., 08/15, DVD. 
 
74. Ibid. 
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Upon examination of German films of the mid-to-late-twentieth century, it becomes 
apparent that the main themes revolved around the dissimilarity of, and often the opposition 
between, the common soldier and the Nazis. On one hand, the heroic victim—valiant, 
fearless, strong, honorable and patriotic—engaged in a brutal, nonsensical war only to defend 
their homeland while, on the other, an evil regime plotted and thrust such victims into said 
war against their wishes. According to Jay Lockenour, this memory had several cultural and 
social implications. First, overt “importance of duty, the resistance of ‘good’ and noble 
Germans, and a powerful, yet passive aversion to war largely replaced memories of 
resignation, collaboration, complicity, patriotism, and racism that existed in the minds of 
many Germans in 1945.” Frustrations over Nazi depredations could therefore be vented and a 
“normative separation from Nazism” established.
75
 Second (and that parallels the 
interpretation of Southern soldiers in American films) romantic interpretations of the World 
War II became the norm. Handsome actors engaged in action-packed battle scenes, on 
foreign landscapes occupied by exotically beautiful women, against an inherently evil 
enemy.
76
 Both on the big screen and in their private lives, the German public could then 
construct a homogenized, coherent, and satisfying national narrative that fit social, political, 
and economic agendas as it proceeded into the twentieth century (which at least for West 
Germany was one of growth and prosperity) and the militaristic needs of the Cold War.
77 
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Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Integration (New York: Colombia University Press, 2002), 303, 232. In 
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Germany, at least according to its collective national memory that was solidified on film, 
could move beyond Nazi crimes and once again assume the role of civilized, trusted society 
with much to give the world. The problem, however, is the romanticized “pantheon of myths 
and memories”—engendered by the omission of the average German’s role within Nazi 
history—continues.
78
 A very specific identity has been crafted around the apolitical and 
ahistorical dichotomy of “Good” Germans and “Evil” Nazis—perhaps still as a coping 
mechanism—and continues to limit, though much less recently, the positive aspects of 
historical recognition and confrontation.   
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 Only five years later with the release 
of Jenseits des Krieges (Beyond the War), a documentary about the German public’s reaction to the 1995  “War 
of Extermination” exhibition in Vienna, did German cinema ever admit to war crimes committed by the 
Wehrmacht. Such violence was finally framed correctly, as regular occurrences instead of an exception, during 
the mid-1990s—over fifty years after the end of the war.  But still, through overt denials or statements of 
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Wehrmacht committed war crimes and justified their brutality. Quote from Lockenour, “Black and White 
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CONCLUSION 
A comparison of historical memory in the post-Civil War American South and post-
World War II Germany has its difficulties: both societies are vastly different geographically, 
culturally, politically, and historically; the events under consideration occurred in different 
centuries; and, following their defeats, both societies were forced to situate their recent 
histories within very different national contexts. However, several broad generalizations can 
be drawn from their experiences. For instance, prior to the wars, both the American South 
and Germany committed acts that history has deemed the pinnacles of modern oppression 
and injustice (chattel slavery in the South and the systematic extermination of Jews, 
communists, homosexuals, and gypsies in German-controlled Europe), both eagerly engaged 
their opponents to further their oppressive ideals, and both governments were then 
overthrown and their lands occupied by outside forces that sought to guide German and 
Southern reconstruction and progression into the future. Thus, despite the litany of national 
and cultural variations, comparing the American South’s memory of the Civil War to 
Germany’s memory of World War II provides insight into how humans process their recent 
pasts and the determining role that defeat and humiliation play in the memory-making 
process.
1
 
                                                          
1. Whereas post-World War II Germany was occupied by actual outside forces (The United States, United 
Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the BENELUX countries), the occupation of the American South by the North 
during Reconstruction presents an obvious problem as the North and South were technically from the same 
nation prior to the war. However, based on the regional variations in politics and economics, the fact that the 
Confederate States of American formed by states that seceded from the Union and the Southern regionalism that 
was solidified upon their defeat, a strong argument for outside occupation by the North is valid.   
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Immediately following the American Civil War and World War II, the generations 
that lived in the Old South and Nazi Germany developed two entirely different responses. In 
Germany, despite few attempts at memorialization, forgetfulness swept the national 
consciousness. Instead of looking to the past with nostalgia, the occupation of the Allies 
rendered Nazi sympathy silent and set most Germans on a path of rebuilding and national 
progress. However, the process of memory making in the South was a direct contrast to that 
of Germany as Southerners looked at the antebellum years fondly and actively resisted their 
Republican Northern occupiers. Active memorialization then gave rise to the Lost Cause 
movement that was an attempt to curb their humiliation and regain regional respect, 
masculinity, and racial superiority over African Americans. Memorials and bereavement 
ceremonies to fallen soldiers became commonplace in the South and Germany immediately 
following the wars, but only in the South were these predominantly in honor of the national 
heroes that fought valiantly for the defeated side. Popular German memorialization, however, 
tended to reflect the sentiments of the Allies or would honor the defeated site obliquely 
through memorial omission.  
Nineteenth and twentieth century Southern writing also glorified the South’s soldiers 
while justifying their secession as a constitutional right, their antebellum racial and paternal 
values, and the war of Northern aggression in which they took part. Conversely, writing from 
the German perspective remained relatively quiet for almost twenty years following World 
War II. Again, these two very different responses appear to not be comparable. However 
both responses—insistent recollection versus silence—stem from a sense of humiliation in 
defeat. Only through the South’s ability to reclaim ideological power from their occupiers 
were Southern authors able to overtly pursue a romantic Confederate agenda. However, 
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despite these important differences, the processes of memory creation in the South and 
Germany furthered existing negative social constructs. In the South, this was again more 
overt as positive memories of slavery and white supremacy were largely accepted and helped 
usher in the Jim Crow era. The negative effects of remembering anti-Semitism in Germany, 
however, were far more indirect as the Holocaust became a large cause of German guilt and 
did not allow anti-Jewish sentiment to be addressed throughout the twentieth century. Anti-
Semitism thus remained, with little confrontation, for many German nationals.  
Forgetfulness continued in Germany throughout the twentieth century as cinema 
dominated both popular remembrance and popular culture alike. While the East and West 
German film industries began to address World War II in their movies they tended to 
overlook the central role that the German Wehrmacht played in the systematic extermination 
of Jews and the imperial aspirations of the Nazis. For most German filmmakers, as well as 
for most German nationals, the Nazis and the German military were separate entities that 
fought for separate goals. The Nazis may have started the war and wanted to cleanse Europe 
of its barbarian hordes, but the German military, and all men drafted into it, were forced to 
fight bravely for the preservation of their homeland. Therefore, the Wehrmacht and Germany 
can be seen as having two enemies in German cinema: the Allies and the Nazis fascist 
desires. 
As war films helped propel German forgetfulness by overlooking the crimes 
committed by the German military throughout Europe, cinema also helped solidify the 
romantic version of the South in the Civil War throughout the twentieth century. Beginning 
just after the turn of the century, black and white silent films first glorified the South in 
American theaters by heralding ordinary Southerners’ defense of their homeland while 
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separating them from the exploits of Confederate leaders. However, Southern leaders did not 
embody the characteristics of evil that German movies placed on the Nazis—General Lee, 
“Stonewall” Jackson, and the like were portrayed as almost God-like. After The Birth of a 
Nation and Gone with the Wind, those images along with the idea that the South fought 
bravely in face of the advancing North for their state’s rights and to protect against the 
pitfalls of freeing the slaves became so entrenched in American memory that no movie could 
challenge the idealized assertions for much of the future. Just as is the case with the German 
Wehrmacht, the South’s memory of war in film held the Confederate army in the best light 
possible while downplaying the role of the true injustice that they fought to uphold during the 
war. 
 However, as has been shown, countermemories existed within both the post-bellum 
South and Germany as African Americans, Jews, and Germans recalled the wars differently 
than mainstream memory. In Germany this meant that either the Jewish community placed 
the Wehrmacht within the model of Nazi militarism or a few German nationals attempted to 
glorify fallen soldiers as pursuing a noble and achievable goal; whereas, in the South, 
intellectuals such as W.E.B. Dubois and organizations such as the NAACP actively produced 
literature from the black perspective and protested the romantic assertions of white 
Southerners. But ultimately, romanticism prevailed in both societies as Germany and the 
South identified themselves as the virtuous protectors of their homelands. Even similar 
second generations of revisionist academics, students, and journalists that questioned the 
idealized assertions of their forebears could not completely remove faulty remembrance from 
the German and American perspectives of war. The Lost Cause and German forgetfulness 
have remained common sentiments. Perhaps this is due to the reconciliation that took place 
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between the North and South behind the veil of a series of twentieth century wars abroad and 
between Germany and the Allies at the onset of the Cold War. In both cases, the Germans 
and the Americans were able to move past their divisive pasts and focus on more 
nationalistic events while romantic sentiments had not been fully addressed. In other words, 
interest of past events diminished in politics and legacies of war became stale while the 
ahistorical ambitions of the Lost Cause and Stunde Null persisted in national psyches.   
Evidence exists that supports the existence of the Lost Cause and German 
forgetfulness in more recent history. In the South, it is not hidden that reenactments, 
ceremonies honoring the Confederate dead, and sons and daughters of Confederate veterans’ 
organizations have existed for decades while, in Germany, sentiments similar to those held 
regarding the events of Bitburg in the 1980s are still common. Even as monument-building 
that honors the victims of the Civil War and World War II has become more popular in the 
United States and Germany, heated debates still arise surrounding the proper construction 
and messages of those memorials. For instance, in the South, counter-monuments to the Lost 
Cause have just started appearing with any frequency but often do not confront 
institutionalized slavery. Instead, monuments such as the Arthur Ashe statue that stands 
heroically among four Confederate legends on Richmond, Virginia’s Monument Avenue 
seek to portray the positive influence that African Americans have had on American culture 
while not making their ancestors appear as victims, oppressed, or helpless. In Germany, 
however, this is vastly different: monuments that honored, yet victimized, persecuted Jews, 
communists, and homosexuals appeared much sooner after the conclusion of the war. And 
while there is controversy regarding how best to portray the perpetrators—either by directly 
articulating a message for the viewer to take away or by leaving the monuments open 
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ended—through memorials in both the South and Germany, the much older memorials to the 
Confederacy remain intact throughout the Southern landscape while engendering feelings of 
both pride, sadness, and less often remorse in their observers. Perhaps the late twentieth 
century brought forth more questions regarding human rights, but the fact that Jews were 
more eager to position themselves as victims and the Nazis as perpetrators remains a stark 
contrast to African Americans, who do not wish to be victimized, and the Confederacy, 
which is often romanticized, in the South.              
 Only time will determine the future of German and Southern memories of war and 
how they persist. However, the history of these memories can be traced. In Germany, 
forgetting was the coping mechanism for the embarrassment and guilt over their vulnerability 
to Nazi policies and genocide; whereas, the South used romantic, mythical remembrance of 
valiant Southern heroes and landscapes to deal with the cultural embarrassment suffered in 
defeat. But in doing so, both the South and Germany remembered as much about the wars 
and their old societies as they forgot; both portrayed themselves as victims in the hands of an 
oppressor (either the North or the Nazis), downplayed their own roles as an oppressor, and in 
turn glorified their common soldiers. But despite these important overarching and 
generalized similarities, the occupation that took place on the soil of the American South and 
Germany can be looked to in order to offer an explanation for the smaller differences. In 
Germany the Allies completely obtained control over the rebuilding and progression of the 
New Germany at the Yalta Conference. Two separate governments were then set up in East 
and West Germany with the intention of proceeding politically, economically, and morally as 
a modern nation in a new Europe. Furthermore, isolationism was almost completely 
abolished, at least for West Germany and other western nations, following World War II as 
78 
 
the Allies opened West Germany to Capitalist markets and assumed a larger role global 
issues. Thus, West Germany was forced to consider its national standing and how it would be 
perceived in the eyes of the Allies who were controlling the moral discourse of the war 
immediately following it. German guilt was high, and their individual dealings with the 
Nazis became easier to ignore than to confront. 
 In the American South, however, the governmental occupation by the Union during 
Reconstruction proved unsuccessful. Instead of the North controlling moral discourse and 
silencing racist sentiments, Southerners responded vehemently against the emancipation of 
slaves. Threats, lynchings, and mutilations became prominent as the writing of the time 
spoke more of the dangers of blacks to the fabric of American society. Furthermore, 
incendiary groups such as the Red Shirts supplanted Republican politicians in the South with 
Southern Democrats such as Wade Hampton. It was much easier—for reasons of global 
connectedness, political strength, and militaristic power—for the South to overthrow its 
occupiers and regain control and influence in the American political system than it would 
have been for postwar Germany to potentially rout the Allies. Thus, it was possible for the 
South to control historical memory and overtly memorialize a mythical Confederacy that 
viewed slavery not as oppression but as a positive social organization.   
Historians must constantly study and scrutinize any mythic or romantic interpretation 
of war and isolate the values and ideals that the loser espoused. In both of these cases, that 
task is not difficult. However, it is much more difficult to recognize antebellum principles 
that reside quietly in popular histories of the Civil War and Lost Cause monuments. Over 
time the landscape and objects on it take on meaning that their builders held dear. In order to 
progress beyond such tragedies as American slavery or Nazi genocide, all nations, being 
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comprised of human beings, must work to better their rhetoric and confront the mythicization 
of history. Moral atrocities can happen on any soil, or to any person. Confronting how 
memory embeds itself within culture and society and perpetuates distorted legacies is 
necessary for the advancement of any nation in a world that too often allows racism, 
paternalism, and militarism to drive its actions.    
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